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"Securities governed by . . . Article [8 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code] are negotiable instruments."' This declares a funda-
mental precondition to today's active securities markets, which
could not function without the indispensable right of bona fide
purchasers for value to extinguish issuer defenses' and adverse
claims' to securities. The breadth and ease of this statement conceals
the fact that it climaxes a long and often tortuous development of
statutory and decisional law. Implicit is the subordination of the
intangible claims and interests of creditors and stockholders to the
instrument so that under the Code such rights do not exist apart
from the certificate;4 indeed, the key definition of a "security" is
the "instrument"-a piece of paper-issued in bearer or registered
form of a type commonly dealt in on the securities markets and
recognized as an established investment medium.5 Also underlying
this proposition is the Code's unitary treatment of all forms of
securities, in contrast to the old law, which subjected creditor securi-
ties to the often inapposite provisions of the Negotiable Instruments
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. Consultant Uniform Commercial Code studies in North Carolina
(1964-1965) and South Carolina (1963).
'G.S. § 25-8-105(1).
G.S. § 25-8-202.
"G.S. § 25-8-301 (2).
'A good illustration is the Code's reversal of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act's provision which made an injunction against transfer a sufficient attach-
ment of a security. Compare N.C. GEN. STATs. § 55-87 (1965) with G.S.
§ 25-8-317. The reason is the holder's continuing power, despite the in-
junction, to transfer the shares to a bona fide purchaser, a point long ago
recognized by Green v. Forsyth Furniture Lines, 198 N.C. 104, 107, 150
S.E. 713, 715 (1929).
8 G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (a).
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Law, treated shares under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and
left other types of securities not subject to any statute but only to
conflicting case law.6 Involved also is the Code's discrimination be-
tween "commercial paper" (Article 3) and "investment securities"
(Article 8) the often divergent rules of which reflect basic differ-
ences between these instruments. And yet both are "negotiable in-
struments," so that the bona fide purchaser of investment paper,
like the holder in due course of commercial paper, enjoys a unique,
favored and sheltered status.
7
I. COvERAGE OF ARTICLE 8
A. Definition of "Security"
Article 8's coverage is shaped by its crucial definition of "secu-
rity"' -a definition that is broad, functional, and formal rather than
substantive. Its object is to include all instruments currently ac-
cepted as investment paper as distinguished from commercial paper,
which is traded in functionally different markets. At the least the
Code term presently embraces shares of stock, bonds and debentures
(whether fixed or contingent or "hybrid" obligations), voting trust
certificates, stock options and warrants, and scrip. The term is not
limited to corporate securities but includes interests in limited
partnerships or business trusts, oil and gas fractional interests, state
and municipal bonds, etc., so long as such investment media con-
form to the Code definition.
On the other hand, the Code definition is not so inclusive as
counter-part terms in federal and state statutes policing the public
sale of securities.' Here the definition of "security" embraces not
only all instruments covered by the Code concept but sweeps into its
net every possible type of interest that a gullible public might be in-
duced to take as an "investment." In securities regulation, emphasis
upon form would invite unscrupulous promoters to fashion unique
' That is, except for an occasional statute in scattered jurisdictions deal-
ing with special situations, e.g., New York's Hofstadter Act recognizing
negotiability of interim security receipts, equipment trust certificates, and
certain bonds secured under a trust indenture, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 704.
Compare G.S. § 25-8-105(1) with G.S. § 25-8-305.8 G.S. § 25-8-102(l) (a).
9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-2(g) (1965) (definition of "security" in blue
sky law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-68(1) (Supp. 1965) (definition of "secu-
rity" in Uniform Gifts to Minors Act). Cf. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 48
Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964) (definition of "security" in the Federal
Securities Act).
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and unusual investment media falling outside any such definition.'
Necessarily, then, securities regulation must look to substance and
reach the unusual, the odd, and the weird contract or arrangement
whether or not traded in organized markets or ordinarily thought
of as investment media. They do so through catchall phrases such
as "investment contract" and "in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security.'"
Since the Code's objective is to confer the priceless gift of nego-
tiability upon securities-not to bar issue and sale of fraudulent
investments-the Code definition favors not the unique and un-
known type of instrument, but the familiar security with which the
organized markets feel comfortable through custom and experience.
The Code definition contrasts with the NIL in deleting many
substantive restrictions. Thus it properly omits the NIL require-
ment of an unconditional promise to pay money;"1 applied to bonds
and debentures, this wrought havoc with many governmental securi-
ties payable out of special funds until legislative aid put their negotia-
ble status beyond question. So, too, the Code definition is not
directly concerned with the substantive validity of a security under
state law, although the definition assumes issue of shares or bonds
in conformity with corporation law and charter requirements, and
recognizes defenses of invalidity in certain situations. Thus, the
Code definition is useful because it puts aside substantive require-
ments and looks instead to matters of form: is the security in bearer
or registered form? is it part of or divisible into a class or series?
is it of a type commonly dealt in on securities markets? These
requirements will be analyzed in detail.
1. The Recognized-Investment-Medium Requirement.-Under
the Code a security must be, among other things, "an instrument
which... is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges
or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued
or dealt in as a medium for investment ... Several points
deserve separate exposition.
1 As expressed by Carlos Israels, "uniqueness of form must logically
militate against inclusion in the category [of securities, since] [c]ommercialjustification for negotiability requires not uniqueness but familiarity." Israels,
Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform Comn-
ntercial Code, 13 Bus. LAW. 676, 678 (1958).
"' UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 1(2) [hereinafter cited
as NIL]; G.S. § 25-3-104(1) (6).12 G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (a) (ii).
[Vol. 44
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A security need only be "'of a type commonly dealt in" on securi-
ties markets. This does not mean that the particular security must
in fact be listed on an exchange or even traded in any market.'3
Indeed, because of transfer restrictions, it may never leave the hands
of the original owners of a closely held corporation. But such com-
mon shares, although surrounded by purchase options and other
transfer restrictions,'14 are still "of a type" that could be traded
should the corporation "go public." Thus, the test is whether the
form of the security is such that it could be publicly traded, not
whether it is or ever will be. This part of the definition thus covers,
at the least, common and preferred shares, warrants and scrip,
bonds and debentures, and perhaps a few variants of these. Other
types of securities "commonly dealt in" the over-the-counter mar-
kets, besides those just mentioned, would include mutual fund
shares, American depositary receipts, and a few others.
Since many recognized investment media are not traded in the
organized markets, the Code definition would be incomplete if it
did not recognize a security "of a type . .. commonly recognized in
any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for invest-
ment." Four possible combinations arise:
(a) The security is a recognized investment medium both where
issued (say Delaware) and where it is dealt in (say North Caro-
lina). This is the usual situation and presents no special problem.
(b) The security is not a recognized investment medium in
either place. For instance, a contract between an "investor" and a
promoter who will raise chinchillas and sell their pelts at a profit to
the investor is not a "security" for Code purposes either where the
contract is peddled (say North Carolina) or where the contract is
"8 The term "securities exchanges" covers national and regional (and
exempted) stock exchanges. It is difficult to determine whether the defini-
tion embraces commodity investment contracts. "Security exchanges" are
certainly different from commodity exchanges, and such contracts are made,
not on security, but on commodity exchanges. Cf. § 3(a) (1) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1) (1964),
defining "exchange" as an organization which affords a "market place or
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for
otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly
performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood." The
term "markets" in G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (a) (ii) must also be read as modified
by "securities" so that it refers to the over-the-counter markets maintained
by brokers and dealers in securities.
14 Issuer-imposed transfer restrictions are recognized in G.S. § 25-8-204.
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to be performed (say South Carolina). No Code problem arises
since it falls outside the definition of a "security."
(c) The security is a recognized investment medium in the place
of issue but not in the place of dealing. The Code definition would
apply, at least absent violation of any public policy in the place of
dealing. Thus, bearer shares are "commonly recognized" in Europe
as a proper "medium for investment," but probably not so in most
of the United States, simply because bearer shares are seldom issued
in this country' 5 and have never interested the investment communi-
ty; European bearer shares are not directly traded because of the
popularity of American depositary receipts. Assuming no actual
public policy in a given state as to investing in bearer shares, the
Code definition would apply and European bearer shares would be
a "security" and negotiable. Although the bearer-share illustration
is not startling, this could logically imply that an odd type of secu-
rity having currency in a foreign country might automatically gain
acceptance as a negotiable security in any and all American Code
states lacking an affirmative policy objection to the type of security.
(d) The security is not a recognized investment medium where
issued but is so regarded where traded. Such a situation would
pose difficult conceptual problems of granting negotiability in the
place of dealing where negotiability would not be recognized in the
place of issue. Hence, the Code definition would mean that an in-
strument not negotiable in Spain could become negotiable in Ameri-
ca if a custom of trading it here is sufficiently strong to establish it
here as a recognized investment medium.
2. The Requirement of Bearer or Registered Form.-A second
formal requisite for an investment security is that it be "an instru-
ment..., issued in bearer or registered form."'" This aptly describes
most securities issued today, and it dispels a shadow, admittedly
slight, cast over bonds by NIL requirements. For although the
bearer bond's form was close enough to the bearer note to avoid
difficulties under the NIL,1 the case as to registered-form bonds
"'Two American jurisdictions recognize bearer shares. CONN. GEN.
STATS. ANN. § 33-345(a) (1961) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 15-608, -611
to -613 (1955).
10 G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (a) (i).
1" Thus in 1934 a leading authority recognized that bearer bonds are
governed by the NIL and that an option to register the bond did not impair
negotiability. Steffen & Russell, Registered Bonds jad Negotiability, 47
HARv. L. REv. 741, 746 n.16, 744 n.11 (1934).
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was vexing. Such bonds and debentures may be fully registered
(that is, as to both principal and interest) or registered only as to
principal (the interest being payable to the bearer of a coupon an-
nexed to the instrument). When such an instrument is so registered,
it was arguable under the NIL that the issuer's obligation runs
only to the single registered holder, since usually the magic words
"or order" will not be included in such long-term creditor instru-
ments."8 Indeed, it is the issuer's intent to confine its obligation to
the registered owner whom it can identify from its "books" and
to account to no one else unless his ownership is registered on the
"books." 9 The absence of the talisman "or order" and the required
"transfer on the books of the corporation" arguably contravenes the
forms of transfer prescribed by the NIL. It is hard to say whether
the issue was ever definitively settled under the NIL, but in all
events the Code forecloses it by recognizing registered-form instru-
ments as such and by omitting any language such as "to order" or
its equivalent. Instead a security is in "registered form" if it "speci-
fies a person entitled to the security or to the rights it evidences
and when its transfer may be registered upon the books maintained
for that purpose by or on behalf of an issuer. .. ." In addition a
security may also be in "registered form" if "the security so
states.
'20
A security is in "bearer form" if "it runs to bearer according
to its terms and not by reason of any indorsement."'t Unregistered
bonds and, more familiarly, bond coupons may be properly trans-
ferred from hand to hand by delivery; so, too, in Europe the holder
of bearer-form shares may vote at shareholder meetings or receive
the current dividend on presenting his share certificate or some other
appropriate instrument.2 2 Because a security is in bearer form only
1 Steffen & Russell, supra note 17, at 744, 759, 768, recognized that a
"to order" clause in a registered bond might eliminate the uncertainty as to
the full negotiability of registered-form bonds, but apparently the idea never
caught on. Oddly enough, as noted later, an "order" bond or debenture,
not required to be registered, would not be a "security" under the Code.
See notes 25-29 infra.
" See G.S. § 25-8-207(1) permitting but not requiring the issuer or an
indenture trustee to treat the registered owner as the person solely entitled
to all rights of the security holder.
2oG.S. § 25-8-102(1) (c).
21 G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (d).
" Assuming as a policy goal that shareholders should be encouraged to
participate in meetings and like corporate activities and receive information
through reports and proxy statements, it is well that bearer shares have
19661
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
if the issuer so states in the instrument, indorsing such an instru-
ment normally has no effect other than sometimes to give notice of
adverse claims. 23 By implication, even a special indorsement would
not preclude further negotiation by delivery alone. Certainly it gives
the holder of the bearer-form security no rights to registration.
Since the issuer's object is to avoid dealing with registered paper,
no such obligation can be thrust upon him merely by indorsing
bearer-form paper. In contrast to the Code's commercial-paper rule,
which makes a special indorsement control further negotiation even
of paper drawn payable to bearer,24 an investment security's form
of negotiation-whether by delivery or by indorsement plus delivery
-is determined for the life of the instrument by the issuer and
not by the accident of the form of transfer chosen by the owner.
So, too, a purported indorsement in blank or expressly to bearer
on a registered-form security does not convert it into a bearer-form
instrument.25 Although it may continue to pass by delivery, the
issuer is not bound by the indorsement, but may ignore the holder
who cannot show the necessary requisites for registration and con-
tinue to recognize only the holder of record.26
By confining the definition to bearer and registered-form instru-
ments, the Code excludes a few long-term investment media. Thus,
a fifty-year note for ten million dollars issued by A Corporation to
never caught on in this country since the issuer would have no way of
knowing where to send reports. The issuer's inability to send reports would
frustrate this sort of regulatory objective. Perhaps issuers did not seek to
evade sometimes unwelcome requirements of full disclosure by using bearer
shares because of the problems of satisfying state-law quorum and vote
requirements and the inability to locate share owners to get proxies needed
for such purposes.
2' G.S. § 25-8-310. Comment 1 to that section indicates that this will
usually occur when the security bears some restrictive indorsement such as
"for collection" or "for surrender" or the like. Presumably, other indorse-
ments might also give notice of adverse claims.
" "Any instrument" governed by Article 3, if "specially indorsed becomes
payable to the order of the special indorsee and may be further negotiated
only by his indorsement." G.S. § 25-3-204(1).
"By clear implication from the words of G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (d) that a
security is in bearer form when "it runs to bearer according to its terms
and not by reason of any indorsement." (Emphasis added.)
"' Again, this contrasts with the commercial paper rule. Since "an in-
strument payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer
and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed," G.S. §
25-3-204(2), the holder, including "a person . . . in possession of . . . an
instrument ... indorsed . . . to bearer or in blank," G.S. § 25-1-201(20),
may discharge the instrument or enforce payment in his own name, G.S. §
25-3-301.
[Vol. 44
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B Insurance Co. and made payable to order but not registerable
would not be governed by Article 8. Its negotiability will then de-
pend on its conformity with the Code's requirements for commercial
papery.2  Thus, a long-term order note payable out of the issuer's
income or subject to some other condition in the promise would
not be negotiable."' This problem can be avoided by making the
income note payable to bearer (instead of order) or by putting it
in registered form, thus returning it to the shelter of Article 8.
Even so, it is not clear why Article 8 should have excluded long-
term securities payable to order but not in bearer or registered
form, particularly since long-term notes have become popular in
direct placements."
3. The Class-or-Series Requirement.-A third formal requisite
is that the security be "either one of a class or series, or by its
terms . . . divisible into a class or series."' Thus, a complicated
corporate financial structure may include Series A, B, C, D, etc., of
First Mortgage Bonds; Series L and M of Subordinated Deben-
tures; Class A of Preferred Stock (of which Series T, U and V
have been issued and are outstanding), and the Common Stock.
A close corporation may issue common stock in Class A with voting
rights, and in Class B with no vote, and conceivably (though im-
probably) subdivide the classes into series.
Although the "class or series" requirement is satisfied easily and
routinely, it may occasionally exact limitations. For instance, war-
rants to buy new stock generally issued to outstanding shareholder
or debenture-holder would comprise a security "class," and a
particular warrant would be "one of a class." But a stock option
issued to a single individual, perhaps incidental to his employment,
would probably not be "one of a class" so that its unique character
would remove it from the definition of a "security."3 1 In contrast,
an employee stock-option plan with options to, say, 100 key em-
ployees would comprise a "class." As a second instance, a fifty-year
" The "formalities" of commercial paper appear in G.S. § 25-3-104(1).
G.S. § 25-3-104(1)(b).29 Perhaps the reason is simply to afford an easy and convenient means
to kill negotiability-do not make the instrument payable to order or bearer
or in registered form-so as to protect the claims of the first holder from
destruction by a holder in due course.
" G.S. § 25-8-102(a) (iii).
1 But the underlying stock would presumably satisfy the class or series
requirement.
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ten-million-dollar debenture privately and specially placed with an
insurance company would seemingly not be a security because not
"one of a class" of securities unless it is in fact one of a class of
debentures or is divisible into smaller units.
The class-or-series requirement is thus consistent with the
idea that a "security" under the Code definition is not a unique
instrument but one "of a type" accepted in securities markets. It
is not the Code's intent to confer negotiability as of course upon the
unique tailor-made instrument. Thus, minimum compliance with
this formality requires that there be at least two instruments in a
specified class or series, or that the single instrument be divisible
into at least one additional instrument, so that the security involved
is "one of a class or series," and does not itself exhaust the class
or series. Presumably, it is sufficient compliance with this require-
ment if Series A of Class B is outstanding although additional
series are yet to be issued (but may never be issued). A formal
recital in the instrument would probably be a sufficient compliance
with the class-or-series requirement.
4. Evidence of a Share or Obligation.-The fourth requirement
is that the security "evidence a share, participation or other interest
in property or in an enterprise or evidence an obligation of the
issuer."32 This language broadly embraces all familiar creditor and
equity interests which pre-Code statutes treated separately. Other
instruments are covered. For instance, a mutual fund certificate
would be "a share.., in property" owned by the fund; an American
Depository Receipt would be an "interest in property" belonging
to the issuing bank, which held the foreign shares backing up the
receipts. Various investment contracts would satisfy this phase of
the definition but usually will not be covered because they are not
commonly accepted on markets or as investment media. It is doubt-
ful that pre-incorporation stock subscriptions could meet the requi-
site, since, when made, they do not evidence any share or interest
in property or in an enterprise, let alone an issuer obligation; rather
they are an undertaking, binding or not as the case may be under
state statutes, to become a shareholder if the corporation is formed
and issues shares. 8
"G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (a) (iv).
8Stock subscriptions are, of course, subject to federal and sometimes
to state securities statutes. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 48 Stat. 74, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964); but see, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-2(g) (1965).
[Vol. 44
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B. The "Security" Definition and New Investment Media
A problem incident to codification of existing law is the possi-
ble freezing of new developments, which would first have appeared
as new customs responding to newly felt needs and practices and
which might then have passed over into rules of law. This is, of
course, much of the story of the law of negotiable instruments (in
the broad sense), both as to reception of the "law merchant" into
the common law and as to rejection of other practices and customs.
While there is a chancey element in a court's recognition of custom
-depending upon the ability of counsel, the intelligence and respon-
siveness of the court, the character of the transaction, the factual
context in which the issue is posed, the inherent equities of the
situation, and other accidental factors-recognition is more easily
achieved absent statutes preempting the area than when the court is
free to act creatively. Investment securities illustrate this difficulty,
since the NIL's overly broad definition of a "negotiable instrument"
included bonds and debentures and thus prematurely codified an
area of law that was still in the formative stage, and codified it in
such a way as to trouble the financial community. In contrast, the
English Bills of Exchange Act3" did not include investment creditor
securities, so that the English courts had a wide area of discre-
tion, and exercised that discretion intelligently, in receiving into
the law at the appropriate time the gradual accretion of custom
relating to investment securities.
Two classic decisions point up the contrast. In Goodwin v.
Robarts,5 two English courts assayed the negotiability of scrip
issued for definitive bonds of the Russian government. Scrip owned
by the plaintiff was held by a broker who pledged it as security for
a loan from defendants, who were bona fide purchasers of the scrip.
On traditional principles governing commercial paper, such scrip
could be challenged on several grounds: (1) the scrip was "pay-
able" not in money but in definitive bonds; (2) the Rothschilds, who
signed the scrip as agents of the Russian government, only obligated
themselves to transmit definitive bonds to the scrip holder; (3) the
script was at least in form that of the agents, the Rothschilds, al-
though interpreted by the court as the direct obligation of the Rus-
sian government, as issuer; and (4) traditional promissory words
"45 & 46 Vict. c. 61 (1882).
(1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 337, aff'd, (1876) 1 App. Cas. 476.
1966]
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were lacking, although the scrip stated that "the bearer will be
entitled to receive a definitive bond or bonds." 6 The decision was
in favor of negotiability so that the defendant pledgee prevailed
over the true owner. The foundation of the decision was a finding
of fact as to usage of more than fifty years by which scrip represent-
ing foreign government obligations had passed by mere delivery.
After rejecting any conception of the law merchant as "fixed and
stereotyped, and incapable of being expanded and enlarged,""7 the
Exchequer Chamber broadly affirmed the continuing vitality of the
"process" by which "what before was usage only, unsanctioned by
legal decision, has become engrafted upon, or incorporated into, the
common law," and taking an advanced view, it emphasized the policy
objectives of facilitating ready transfer of securities rather than "re-
quiring some more cumbrous method of assignment" that would
"materially hamper the transactions of the money market . . .and
cause great public inconvenience."3
More than fifty years later, President & Directors of the Man-
hattan Co. v. J. P. Morgan39 considered the negotiability of scrip
similar to that upheld in Goodwin v. Robarts, although its terms
and conditions were more explicitly stated. Thus, the "interim re-
ceipts" for Belgian government bonds, issued by J. P. Morgan and
Company, were "payable" not in money but in definitive bonds and
contained explicitly conditional promises to deliver definitive bonds
and pay interest only if, as and when bonds and interests were
received. The court held these instruments nonnegotiable and thus
voided plaintiff's claim as a bona fide purchaser of instruments that
had been stolen and later transferred. The thrust of the decision is
the impossibility of holding, in the teeth of the explicit and pervasive
NIL "formal requirements," that such instruments could be nego-
tiable. Even assuming that, absent statute, Goodwin v. Robarts
would have governed, or that a sufficient custom in New York bank-
ing circles had been established, neither precedent nor custom could
prevail over positive law requirements. The only recourse, promptly
forthcoming, was New York's Hofstadter Act40 making security
The text of the instrument appears at (1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 337, at 339.
' Id. at 346.
" Id. at 353.
"242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
,N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 704.
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receipts (and other instruments such as equipment trust certificates)
negotiable.
Thus, new statutes are clearly the best means for assuring that
new forms of investment securities will be negotiable, but at least
two difficulties appear. First, such a statute will not usually be
enacted except in response to a decision striking down the negotia-
bility of a new type of instrument; and even so there may be delays
in passing the corrective legislation. More deeply, there is a subtle
problem as to how a new and untried security will be sufficiently
accepted in financial circles to permit growth of a custom that can
be the predicate for a judicial finding of negotiability-that is, as-
suming that courts still have some leeway to declare new securities
to be negotiable.
This poses the problem of new securities and the Code definition.
Crucial here is the requirement that a security be "of a type com-
monly dealt in upon" securities markets or "commonly recognized
... as a medium for investment."'" But a new type of security by
hypothesis cannot be "of a type" specified by this requirement until
sufficient time elapses for a custom to arise. Growth of a custom
recognizing a new security not within the Code definition is re-
tarded: its negotiability is at best uncertain, and investment and
financial circles may not want to risk money on it. We can illus-
trate with a security which an intermediate appellate New York
court held in 1938 was "not freely bought and sold in the market
place and did not pass from hand to hand like certificates of stock."
4 2
These mortgage participation certificates would probably be re-
garded today as acceptable investment media and thus a "security"
under the Code.4" But if the Code definition had been in force in
1938, it is difficult to see how they could have been securities at
that time, and the probable impairment of their sale and transfer
would retard any growth in custom. Again, the order bond, not
covered by Article 8, illustrates the problem. Although perhaps not
used so extensively today, it may well prove at some time and in
some situations to afford a better medium for money-raising than
41G.S. § 25-8-102(1) (a) (ii).
42 Oppenheimer v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 253 App. Div. 356, 2
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1938).
' Compare recent SEC litigation regarding a related type of "security"
in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th
Cir. 1960).
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conventional securities. But such an instrument is not under the
Code definition a "security," and if it is payable out of income, it is
not even commercial paper.
This is not to say that the Code definition is undesirable or
that codification is improper at this time. Indeed, I suggest that
much of the law of investment securities has reached a stage of
maturity where codification, as worked out in Article 8, is appro-
priate; and that the values of certainty from a good codification-
and Article 8 is certainly that-outweigh a possible yoke that
statutory language may impose upon judicial innovation in this area.
For one thing, it is not entirely bad that new forms of investment
securities must prove themselves and may not too swiftly acquire
the exalted status of negotiable securities, even as a matter of mer-
cantile custom. Moreover, it cannot be said-or, at least, I cannot
say-that a custom of free transfer by delivery of instruments may
never be able to develop as to new types of securities even though
there is no assurance that they will ultimately be held negotiable-a
risk which presumably all forms of currently accepted investment se-
curities ran at some time in their careers. Thus, it still remains
possible that custom can develop within the interstices of the Code
definition,44 and thereby a security may come to be "of a type . . .
commonly recognized . . . as a medium for investment." A subtle
point is worth noting. The Code language does not require that
securities be commonly recognized as negotiable securities in the
strict sense of extinguishing adverse claims and issuer defenses.
Rather they need only be recognized as a "medium for investment,"
a broader concept than "security" itself, since an instrument may
be a recognized investment medium but not a "security" because
it does not meet certain other requirements of the definition. Al-
though not completely clear on this point, certain language in Good-
win v. Robarts intimates that proof of mercantile custom means
proof of common acceptance and ready transfer, and not some ex-
" Because of the Code requirement that securities be commonly dealt in
or recognized as investment media, the definition of security does not recog-
nize "negotiability by contract," i.e., negotiability resulting solely from the
inclusion of clauses waiving defenses or adverse claims as to subsequent
holders or negotiability by say-so. Thus the requirement still envisions "cus-
tom" as giving preliminary approval to securities as negotiable instruments
before the courts make their final determination. Of course, clauses purport-
ing to waive defenses and adverse claims as to subsequent holders, while not
creating negotiability ipso facto, may contribute to the growth of the custom
of accepting the instruments as negotiable.
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plicit recognition in the minds of merchants and financiers that the
legal consequences of negotiability--extinguishing defenses and
claims-will necessarily occur. If developing custom means some-
thing like this, then the Code does provide moderate accommoda-
tion for custom to mature new forms of investments into securities
suitable for full negotiable status.
Beyond that, a probable safeguard is the response of legislatures,
though delayed, to confer negotiable status on instruments where
needed. Examples include widely enacted legislation recognizing
negotiability of government revenue and other bonds otherwise non-
negotiable because payable from specified funds, and New York's
Hofstadter Act, already noted as responsive to the Manhattan de-
cision.
The conclusion, then, is that the definition of "security" is a
good one. It is sufficiently limited to include instruments that de-
serve negotiability, and at the same time it has enough play in the
joints to avoid inhibiting new developments. At the very least,
because the concept of "security" has been radically dissociated from
commercial money paper, and because substantive requirements ap-
propriate to commercial paper are absent, there is greater flexibility
for future growth.
II. ISSUER DEFENSES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Ever since Chafee's pioneer work,45 it has been customary to
distinguish between defenses of the maker of a negotiable instru-
ment and ownership interests or claims that others may assert as
to the instrument. This distinction appears in Article 8, which
separately treats issuer defenses and "adverse claims" and some-
times provides different rules. 6 Moreover, the "defenses" an issuer
may raise as to an investment security are often significantly differ-
ent from those arising in a commercial paper transaction. These
defenses tend to cluster around the "power" of the issuer, whether
' Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper,.31 Hav. L. Rnv. 1104, 1122 (1918).
"E.g., compare the "purchaser for value and without notice" who can
extinguish issuer defenses under G.S. § 25-8-202 with the "bona fide pur-
chaser"; see G.S. §§ 25-8-301(2), -302, and the "purchaser for value and
without notice of adverse claims who has in good faith received a new
... security on registration of transfer," G.S. § 25-8-311(a), both of whom
can, in defined situations, extinguish claims of the "true owner" of the
security. Compare also the different time periods which the Code's "stale
security" rule specify for issuer defenses, G.S. § 25-8-203(1), and for ad-
verse claims, G.S. § 25-8-305.
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a "private corporation" or a governmental entity, to issue a partic-
ular security; the difficulties presented by "forged" certificates; and
problems of recent vintage involving stock transfer restrictions de-
signed either to keep small corporation shares "closely held" or to
preserve some exemption under federal and state statutes regulating
sale of securities. Here, as with commercial paper, the general prop-
osition is that an issuer's defenses will fail if the security has come
to rest with a purchaser for value and without notice of the partic-
ular defense---the analogue of the holder in due course of com-
mercial paper."' Furthermore, the Code sometimes speaks of
"validating" a security held by such a purchaser as a remedy used
in lieu of damages or a right of rescission or some other form of
relief. If validating the security would cause an overissue, the Code
then affords alternative remedies: the issuer may be compelled to
acquire and furnish a security,49 or if no such security is readily
available for purchase, the issuer must respond in damages.8 0 Faced
with the problem of an overissue of securities, which corporate law
makes absolutely void,"' the Code unfortunately rejected the simple
and rational method of compelling the corporation to amend its
charter to validate the overissue; and instead adopted a clumsy
procedure that contains some serious problems. 2
A. Validity of Security--Private Issuer 3
Suppose that a corporation issues shares of stock which do not
comply with statutory requirements as to quality of consideration,54
e.g., the stock is watered 5 or perhaps was issued for no considera-
tion at all. Or, perhaps, a corporation issued a type of security
'" See generally G.S. § 25-8-202.
" Compare G.S. §§ 25-8-202 and -302 with G.S. § 25-3-302(1).
,Q G.S. § 25-8-104(1) (a).o G.S. § 25-8-104(1) (b).
"
1 Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 356, 152 At.
342 (Sup. Ct. 1930); New York & N.H.R.R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30(1865); see G.S. § 25-8-104, comment 1.
"For a detailed discussion of these matters see Folk, Some Problems
under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 ARIz. L. Ruv. 193, 207-
11 (1964).
"G.S. § 25-8-202(2) (a).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-46(a) (1965) (lawful consideration for
issue of shares) ; § 55-46(b) (1965) (forbidding promissory notes and like
obligations as payment for shares).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53(b) (1965) imposing liability upon any
"original holder" of "watered shares," a liability to make up the unpaid
balance of the consideration that should have been received for the shares.
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which, under applicable statutory requirements, it was not author-
ized to issue. Under the. Code, defenses of this character, testing
the validity of the issue, may be asserted against anyone other than
a "purchaser for value and without notice of the particular defect.""0
Thus, an original purchaser of a new issue of shares would take the
security free and clear of the corporation's defense as would a subse-
quent purchaser who acquired his shares on resale in securities mar-
kets. But the Code language obviously excludes a donee, even a
subsequent donee, of a tainted security ;17 it also withholds protection
from a purchaser for value who knew of the "particular defect"" s-
an interesting and desirable modification of the old rule that any
guilty knowledge opened up all defenses against the holder.59 Thus,
the issuer can assert only those defenses that the purchaser can be
shown to have known about; his knowledge of an adverse claim
would not allow the issuer also to assert a defense against the
purchaser.
The Code states a stricter rule if the security is "invalid" because
violating some constitutional requirement,6 as in a state that en-
shrines the consideration requirement for stock in a constitutional
clause."' North Carolina is not one of those states; however, given
such a situation, only "a subsequent purchaser for value and without
notice of the defect" takes free of the defense, thus allowing the
corporation to reclaim the securities when held only by the original
purchasers, however innocent they may have been. The object is to
give greater weight to a constitutional requirement and permit it
to be overriden by the policy of free negotiability of securities only
"6 The code position is consistent with North Carolina's unique "watered
stock" statute, see note 55 supra, which provides that "transferee of such
shares shall not be liable thereon if he acquired them in good faith without
knowledge or notice that they were watered shares or shares not fully paid
as agreed or if he acquired them from a transferor similarly free from
liability." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53(f) (1965).
" However, the donee might be able to take such rights as his transferor
had, including, if his transferor was a bona fide purchaser, immunity from an
issuer's defense. See G.S. §§ 25-8-301(1), -1-201(32), -1-201(33) defining
"purchase" and "purchaser" to include "taking by . . . gift or any other
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property."
" Even such a holder might be able to claim the rights of a prior bona
fide purchaser under G.S. § 25-8-301(1), at least so long as the holder was
not a party to fraud or illegality affecting the security.
" NIL § 58, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-64 (1953).60 G.S. § 25-8-202(2) (a).
" For instance, S.C. CoNsT. art. 9, § 10 specifies permissible considera-
tion on issue of shares.
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when shown that the security was in fact negotiated among holders
and came to rest with an innocent purchaser.
Thus the Code technique, in dealing with "invalid" securities,
is, as a general rule, to make them good when held by innocent
purchasers for value rather than award damages, which may be an
inadequate substitute for the security and which might also have a
disrupting effect on a corporation's finances to the possible detri-
ment of creditors. However, this validation approach is limited by
the Code's special treatment of a particular type of invalidity-an
overissue of securities. 62
B. Validity of Security-Governmental Issuers s
The really acute problems of "validating" securities have typical-
ly arisen in the context of governmental rather than private issues,
or here at least the legal concepts have been more explicitly formu-
lated. Not only were governmental issues, usually bonds issued by
states and their subdivisions, of suspect negotiability because they
did not comply with the NIL formalities; but even where they were
impeccable in this respect, they were often issued without conform-
ing to special statutory requirements. Moreover, there were strong
policy arguments that it would be wrong if not sinful to dissipate
taxpayers' contributions through "illegally" issued bonds, however
trivial the defect, and this laudable concern for governmental scru-
pulousness outweighed even the interests of innocent purchasers.
The North Carolina decisions, of course, felt the tension of these
opposing policies, but in general they resolved the question effective-
ly and in accord with the dominant and quite pragmatic American
view." It is this prevailing approach which has been codified into
the Code.
Stated generally, and rather abstractly, the Code "validates" gov-
ernmental securities by imposing additional requirements looking
to the protection of the taxpayers, upon those already exacted in
connection with private issuers. Thus, the governmentally issued
security must be held by an innocent purchaser for value or, if the
defect is of constitutional origin, a subsequent innocent purchaser
for value. In addition, the security is valid only if (1) the govern-
02 G.S. § 25-8-104, discussed in the text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
G.S. § 25-8-202(2) (b).
"G.S. § 25-8-202, comment 6.
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mental agency has substantially conformed to the "legal require-
ments" applicable to the particular issue, or (2) it has received
"substantial consideration" for the security and the "stated purpose
of the issue is one for which the issuer has power to borrow money
or issue the security." The first condition primarily seeks to sustain
an issue against claims of some insubstantial defects, typically some
defect at some stage of the process by which the issue is approved
and, in particular, some defect in voting on the issue which has
not misled the electorate. 5 Thus, the North Carolina court has
held that as against a bona fide purchaser a municipality may not
assert that the bonds were authorized at a special than a regular
aldermen's meeting, 6 nor may it plead some nonsubstantial defi-
ciency in the conduct or result of the election to approve the bond
issue,67 or that the bonds were issued by de facto rather than de
jure town officers, 68 or were not signed by all of the incumbent
commissioners required to certify them.69 Under the Code, as under
the North Carolina decisions-and the prevailing American view-
the test is one of substantial conformity with the statutory formali-
ties. 70
The second condition-substantial consideration received for
securities within the agency's power to issue-also follows ante-
cedent case law in giving effect, via an "estoppel" concept, to recitals
in the bond issue, provided that agency had "power" to issue the
securities. Thus, an issue may be validated in the hands of an inno-
cent purchaser for value, even though there are substantial devia-
tions from statutory requirements, e.g., a seriously defective election,
if money has been received and purchasers have relied upon the
irecitals. Thus, if a town were to have received funds for bonds
issued for a sewage district authorized by statute and the bonds
" The South Carolina court noted as the relevant test whether the voters
'knew of the election and the question to be determined and had an adequate
opportunity to express their will without being misled or misinformed be-
.cause of the irregularities. Phillips v. City of Rock Hill, 188 S.C. 140,
198 S.E. 604 (1938).
"' Bankers Trust Co. v. City of Statesville, 203 N.C. 399, 408, 166 S.E.
169, 174 (1932).
o Reiger v. Commissioners of Town of Beaufort, 70 N.C, 319 (1874).
a Smith v. Town of Carolina Beach, 206 N.C. 834, 175 S.E. 313 (1934).
oBank of Statesville v. Town of Statesville, 84 N.C. 169 (1881).
To Board of Comm'ns of City of Hendersonville v. C.N. Malone & Co.,
179 N.C. 604, 103 S.E. 134 (1920); Hill v. Skinner, 169 N.C. 405, 86 S.E.
351 (1915); Wilmington, 0. & E.C.R.R. v. Commissioners of Onslow
County, 116 N.C. 563, 21 S.E. 205 (1895).
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recited compliance with statutory formalities, these recitals would
override the municipality's efforts to show a major defect in the
election. But if under the same circumstances the bonds were issued
for some purpose unauthorized by statute, e.g., to acquire and donate
land as a lure to a corporation to build a plant, they would be
invalid no matter who held them and no matter how clean his
hands and pure his heart. The North Carolina court once succinct-
ly declared that
a careful distinction should be drawn between the want of power
to issue bonds, and mere irregularities in the exercise of that
power. The latter, under certain circumstances, may be cured
by recitals, or eliminated by estoppel; but a want of power goes
to the very root of the transaction, and destroys its vitality.71
In short, the purchaser can rely on the bond's recitals of proper
purpose and thus preclude the city from asserting that the purpose
was something else, so long as the city had the power to issue bonds
for that purpose; but recitals of power do not work an estoppel.
Thus, several North Carolina decisions have rejected a munici-
pality's claim that the bond proceeds were used for an improper
purpose.
72
In one respect, the Code rule appears to alter prior law. Old
North Carolina decisions consistently held that defenses to municipal
securities grounded on noncompliance with a constitutional require-
ment are available against any bona fide purchaser for value, 3 and
even recognition of the obligation by paying interest does not pre-
clude later assertion of the defense,74 since "there can be no bona fide
holders of unconstitutional obligations."75 This rule was applied
even to a nonconformity with some particular type of procedure
that, fortuitously, was required by a constitutional rather than a
mere statutory clause.7 To this extent, the Code modifies the old
71 Commissioners of Wilkes County v. Call, 123 N.C. 308, 311, 31 S.E.
481, 482 (1898).
12 Smith v. Town of Belhaven, 150 N.C. 156, 63 S.E. 610 (1909); High-
tower v. City of Raleigh, 150 N.C. 569, 65 S.E. 279 (1909).
"'Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730, 36 S.E. 167 (1900); Union Bank v.
Commissioners of Town of Oxford, 119 N.C. 214, 35 S.E. 966 (1896).
"' Commissioners of Stanly County v. Snuggs, 121 N.C. 394, 28 S.E. 539
(1897).
7 Debnam v. Chitty, 131 N.C. 657, 681, 43 S.E. 3, 10 (1902).
' Glenn v. Wray, 126 N.C. 730, 36 S.E. 167 (1900); Commissioners
of Stanly County v. Snuggs, 121 N.C. 394, 28 S.E. 539 (1897); Union




rule-which has not been applied in forty years-by perfecting a
security held by a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value if there
has been substantial consideration for the issue plus inherent power
in the agency to issue a security for the purpose stated in the secu-
rity.
The Code deals only with the validity of securities actually issued
and in the hands of purchasers. To this extent, it codifies rules of
law now well settled-and almost never applied today. For the
routine but salutary practice of procuring firm opinions from skilled
counsel as to the validity of municipal and other governmental issues
has all but eliminated litigation on the problems that so troubled
the courts from fifty to one hundred years ago. But since the Code
deals only with already issued securities, it does not preclude or limit
actions by taxpayers (or other interested persons with standing)
from challenging the validity of a bond issue, whether for want of
power or for violation of prescribed procedure or for any other
reason. This is, of course, not a matter affecting the negotiability
of securities and remains untouched by the Code rules.
C. Incorporation by Reference'"
Many investment securities are issued with terms stated not only
on the face of the security-indeed some terms are required to be
"conspicuously noted" to be effective -but also in a side instru-
ment incorporated by reference into the security. Thus bonds,
debentures, and occasionally preferred shares are issued under in-
dentures describing in enormous detail the mortgage or other secu-
rity for the instruments and typically vesting most of the rights of
action for breach of the bond or the indenture in a trustee.7 9 Rarely
would it be physically possible to state these terms on the instru-
ment itself, and even if someone accomplished such a tour de force
-comparable to engraving a prayer on a pin head-"it would in-
deed be only a fictitious protection to insist that such provisions
as this should be incorporated in the bonds. The investor who would
read with so much care the whole of a bond so voluminous as it
would become, were all the limitations included, would be as likely
- G.S. § 25-8-202(1).8 See G.S. § 25-8-204.
"' If the issue is for more than one million dollars and will be sold
through the mails or interstate commerce, and enjoys no federal exemption,
it must qualify under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
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to look at the mortgage, if the bond referred to the mortgage.""0
The old fear was that the voluminous terms of an indenture might
be held to qualify the bond's fundamental promise to pay and thus
destroy the negotiability of the bond; indeed, the very fact of refer-
ence to an extrinsic document, particularly through such naughty
words as "subject to" or "goverend by,"'" alone threatened nego-
tiability, even if the indenture's language in no way conditioned
the promise to pay. These spectral, though nonetheless alarming,
fears were largely dispelled when the New York Court of Appeals
ruled in Enoch v. Brandon2 that the indenture's promises, condi-
tions, limitations, and so forth related only to the security for the
bond and not to the promise to pay, and thus upheld the bond's
negotiability. New York's Hofstadter Act later sought to codify
this rule.8"
The Code rule is to make both the terms of the security and an
indenture incorporated by reference conclusive against any holder
of the security regardless of his knowledge of the term. Of crucial
importance is the absence of any substantive limitation on the kind
of terms permissible in the indenture or the security itself. Thus,
limitations and conditions on the promise to pay, or vesting an
indenture trustee with rights of action under the security, do not
impair negotiability. The test is a purely formal one: Is there any
conflict between the "stated terms" of the security and indenture
or any other terms incorporated by reference? Although the Code
does not specify the consequences of a conflict, presumably the terms
of the security would prevail over indenture terms. If the conflict
is between the terms of the security and "those made part of the
security by reference . . . to a constitution, statute, ordinance, rule,
regulation, order or the like,"'84 the conflict would have to be
resolved on the basis of other Code provisions already considered.8"
"Judge Learned Hand in Babbitt v. Read, 236 Fed. 42, 45 (2d Cir.
191") This rule has been preserved for commercial paper by G.S. § 25-3-
105(2) (a). See also G.S. § 25-3-105, comment 8.
"249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
3 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 704.
G.S. § 25-8-202(1).
Text accompanying notes 53-76 supra. G.S. § 25-8-202(1) also protects
the innocent purchaser for value and without notice by providing that in-
corporation by reference gives no constructive notice of "a defect going to
the validity of the security" despite an express recital that it does. Thus, the
risk of the security's invalidity is shifted from purchaser to issuer who
can most conveniently guarantee the security's validity or at least minimize
the risk of invalidity.
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D. "Genuineness" and Unauthorized Signatures8 6
Under the Code, an issuer is not liable on a security, even to a
bona fide purchaser unless it is "genuine,"8 that is, "free of forgery
or counterfeiting"8 " and to this extent it accords with established
law both as to investment securities8 9 and commercial paper, ° which
has never required one to honor an obligation which is not his
own. 1 However, the innocent purchaser, who carries the risk, has
some possible protection in that any transfer agent, registrar or
authenticating trustee who signs the security warrants that it is
genuine and thus free of forgery or counterfeiting.92
Much more common than outright counterfeits are genuine in-
struments issued with an unauthorized signature, typically by an
employee who gains access to the securities and forges the corporate
officer's signature, which must appear on the instrument; or perhaps
facsimile signatures of officers are engraved on the certificate, as
permitted by corporate law, and the dishonest employee forges any
countersignatures necessary to make the certificate readily transfer-
able. Without the special rule of the Code, section 8-205, the issuer
would have a complete defense, since the signature in question was
"made without actual, implied or apparent authority" and probably
was a forgery.9 3
Confronted with this quite common type of dishonesty, the
courts rejected a flat rule either granting or denying the issuer a
defense in all instances of unauthorized signatures on certificates.
Rather, the overwhelming weight of authority validated the securi-
ty held by an innocent purchaser for value if the signatures were
made, however dishonestly and for whatever private purpose, by
employees of the issuer (or its transfer agent or registrar) who were
entrusted with the certificates; as to these, the corporation, on stan-
dard agency principles, assumed the risk of the erring employee.
Thus, Havens v. Bank of Tarboro94 sustained in favor of an inno-
86 G.S. §§ 25-8-202(3), -205.87 G.S. § 25-8-202(3).G.S. § 25-1-201 (18).
89 *.S § 25-8-202, comment 3.
'o See G.S. § 25-3-404.9 1That is, apart from estoppel or ratification. Compare G.S. § 25-8-311
with G.S. § 25-3-404(1).92 G.S. § 25-8-208(1) (a).
"' This is the definition of the term "unauthorized" in G.S. § 25-1-
201 (43).
'132 N.C. 214, 43 S.E. 639 (1903).
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cent purchaser for value stock certificates that had been signed by
the corporation's officers and entrusted to an employee who subse-
quently issued them to himself to use as collateral on a personal
loan. The theory of the case was that the negligent corporation
rather than the innocent purchaser (the pledgee bank)9" should bear
the risk of loss. On the other hand, as the New York cases have
made clear, the issuer is not responsible if the employee is not one
entrusted with the securities."6 Thus, in Hudson Trust Co. v.
American Linseed Co., 7 the innocent purchaser for value lost when
it was established that "a general clerk, particularly employed in the
meal and transportation departments" ' and occasionally called on
to assist the head of the stock transfer department in a ministerial
capacity, had taken from a vault stock certificates, previously signed
by the appropriate officers, dated them, filled in his name as owner,
forged countersignatures of the registrar, and obtained a loan; upon
default, the securities were sold and passed into the hands of inno-
cent purchasers who sought but were refused registration into their
names. The Code provision adopts this distinction, for, in sub-
stance, it establishes a statutory rule of apparent authority entitling
innocent purchasers for value to rely upon the appearance of reg-
ularity in the issue of securities. Stated otherwise, the issuer must
assume the risk that its own employees or its transfer agent and its
responsible employees will not exceed their actual authority in issu-
ing securities. This fairly allocates risk between purchaser and
issuer. The issuer can protect itself against malfeasance of its own
or its transfer agent's employees by taking out appropriate fidelity
bonds, requiring indemnification agreements from a transfer agent,
and so on. In contrast, the innocent purchaser has little or no
opportunity to determine whether a seemingly regular procedure is
in fact vitiated by want of authority, especially in the mechanized
and impersonal operations of stock transfers. At the same time the
issuer is relieved from the consequences of misconduct by persons
whose wrong-doing cannot reasonably be foreseen or guarded
" A pledgee is a purchaser under the Code. G.S. § 25-1-201(32).
" The leading cases are Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co.,
232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178 (1922); Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148
N.Y. 652, 43 N.E. 68 (1896); Fifth Ave. Bank v. Forty-Second St. &
G.S.F.R.R., 137 N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 378 (1893).07 232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178 (1922). The court distinguished Havens
v. Bank of Tarboro.
o1 Id. at 353, 134 N.E. at 178.
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against. Although admittedly the purchaser cannot tell whether the
signer of his certificate was or was not "entrusted with" it, both
case law and Code deem it unfair to saddle the issuer with the risk
of loss in every situation and therefore reject any absolute issuer
liability. 9
It is common practice for corporations to keep on hand a supply
of stock or bond certificates already signed by authorized corporate
personnel and thus ready for issue. Prior law established that this
practice was not in itself negligent,' and the Code recognizes the
effectiveness of a signature "placed on a security prior to . . .
issue."' 1 Moreover, the Code rule takes account of the common
practice, authorized by most corporation statutes, of engraving fac-
simile signatures of corporate officers on the certificate if it is to be
countersigned by a transfer agent or registered by a registrar.0 2
E. Warranties of Authenticating Trustees and Others'08
We have already noted that one signing or countersigning a
security warrants its genuineness. In addition, the signer also war-
rants that his own participation in issuing the security is (1) within
his capacity, e.g., a bank would warrant its power under statute or
charter to act as transfer agent, and (2) within the scope of his
authority, which is substantially the agent's common-law warranty
of authority. Thirdly, the signer warrants it has "reasonable grounds
to believe that the security is in the form and within the amount
the issuer is authorized to issue." Thus, the transfer agent would
not warrant such facts to be true, but only its "reasonable" belief,
which is to say that the transfer agent is liable only for its own
lack of due care. This matter is routinely handled through counsel's
opinion as to the proper form and authorized amount of the issue
of stocks or bonds. Beyond these three warranties, a transfer agent
certifies nothing else, and in particular it represents nothing as to
" Probably G.S. § 25-8-205 would not preclude issuer liability even on a
signature by one not "entrusted with" the security, e.g., by the clerk in
Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., 232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178
(1922), on showing that the issuer's own negligence in leaving certificates
readily available for misuse invited such a result. Estoppel concepts seem-
ingly could be invoked. See G.S. § 25-1-103.
... This was specifically so held in Hudson Trust Co. v. American Lin-
seed Co., 232 N.Y. 350, 361, 134 N.E. 178, 181-82 (1922).
101 G.S. § 25-8-205 (preamble).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-57(b) (1965).
103 G.S. § 25-8-208.
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the validity of the issue.104 Thus, there is no right of action against
a transfer agent by one who purchased municipal bonds held not
to bind the city because of some substantial defect; nor would a
purchaser have a right over against a transfer agent as to shares of
stock held unenforceable for want of consideration required by a
statutory or constitutional provision.
The Code does not indicate whether these warranties implied by
law may be varied by contractual provision.105 The pertinent test is
whether the variance would purportedly waive a Code-imposed
"obligation of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care."'1 I
suggest that none of these warranties may be curtailed by agree-
ment. Thus it would be improper for the transfer agent who is in
a better position to detect forgeries or counterfeiting to abridge its
warranty of genuineness' 7 and shift the risk to the innocent pur-
chaser who is least able to detect or guard against them. Nor would
it be proper to limit the transfer agent's warranty of capacity and
authority,' which are intended to protect the investing public.
Finally, it would clearly be improper for a transfer agent to disclaim
its warranty of reasonable grounds of belief as to form and amount
of the issue,' since this would impair a Code-imposed obligation of
diligence and care.
F. Other Defenses of the Issuer
Several other possible issuer defenses may be briefly noted. The
issuer cannot contest a security on the ground of no delivery or
conditional delivery. 10 When this provision is coupled with the
Code rule that a duly signed but otherwise incomplete security may
be filled up by "any person,""' the old NIL rule that nondelivery
of an incomplete instrument constituted a real defense 12 is abolished
both for investment and commercial paper.'" As with commercial
G.S. § 25-8-208(2).
... Under G.S. § 25-1-102(3), Code provisions may be "varied by agree-
ment," even when there is no specific permission in a given section indicat-
ing that it may be so varied. See G.S. § 25-1-102(4).
10" Under G.S. § 25-1-102(3), such obligations "may not be disclaimed
by agreement."10 G.S. § 25-8-208(1) (a).
108 G.S. § 25-8-208(1) (b).
"0' G.S. § 25-8-208(1) (c).
2
0 G.S. § 25-8-202(4).
11L G.S. § 25-8-206(1).
.1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-21 (1953).
"In G.S. §§ 25-3-115, -305, -306(c). See also G.S. § 25-3-305, comment 3.
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paper," 4 completed but altered investment paper may be enforced
according to its original terms; 5 this accords with the view of
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act," 6 although it is contrary to the
NIL rule,"' and thus states a uniform rule for all forms of invest-
ment securities.
Under the Code, issuer defenses are not available against the
purchaser of an overdue or matured security if he acquired them
within specified time periods after the maturity or performance
date."' Thus, the Code rule drastically departs from the NIL view
that one could not be a holder in due course of an overdue instru-
ment,"' and it is more liberal than the Code's commercial-paper
rule, which precludes holder in due course status to one taking an
instrument with notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored. 20
Thus, a creditor security immediately due because of some issuer
default, 12' or a security still circulating after a stated date for re-
demption or conversion, 2 2 may still be taken free of issuer defenses
for limited time periods after the event. This provision simply
recognizes that investment securities continue in circulation after a
default or some other event and states a rule consistent with market
practice. 23 But once the security has become "stale," i.e., the grace
' G.S. § 25-3-407(2) (b).
115 G.S. § 25-8-206(2).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90 (1965).
1
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-131 (1953).
"'G.S. § 25-8-203(1). Interestingly enough, this rule accords with a
pre-NIL viev in North Carolina that one could be a holder in due course
of overdue commercial paper, Bradford v. Williams, 91 N.C. 7 (1884); Hill
v. Shields, 81 N.C. 250 (1879); Parker v. Stallings, 61 N.C. 590 (1868), a
position warmly endorsed by the late Professor Chafee who argued that a
bona fide purchaser for value of post-maturity paper should be able to
extinguish adverse claims ("equities of ownership") but not defenses
("equities of defense"), Chafee, supra note 45, at 1104, 1108, 1129, although
Chafee thought that the first two 'decisions cited above went too far in
allowing the destruction of defenses, id. at 1129 n.70. Curiously enough,
this "liberal" pre-NIL rule as to commercial paper was not adopted for
investment securities where it might more logically apply, Belo v. Commis-
sioners of Forsyth County, 76 N.C. 489, 494 (1877) (defenses to municipal
bonds available against a purchaser of overdue bonds), and, of course, the
NIL' whein enacted, precluded HDC status as to overdue paper, NIL § 58,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-64 (1953). Thus the Code adopts for investment
paper the ancient North Carolina rule for commercial paper and rejects
the corresponding rule previously applied to investment securities.1
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-58 (1953).
120 G.S. §§ 25-3-302(1) (c), -304(3).
.. See G.S. § 25-8-203(1) (b) (two-year grace period).
22 See G.S. § 25-8-305(1) (a) (one-year grace period).
.2 The most spectacular illustration is the circulation of Czarist Russian
bonds until well after the Second World War.
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periods for free circulation have expired, all defenses of the issuer
may come in against even a purchaser for value without notice of
the particular defect.
Finally, although it is not properly deemed a defense, the Code
recognizes the issuer's established corporate-law privilege of looking
solely to the person in whose name the security is registered and
ignoring the beneficial owner who has not as yet had the security
registered into his name.12 4
G. Stock Transfer Restrictions
Of increasing importance today is the stock transfer restriction,
which involves an interplay of the Code," 5 corporation law, securi-
ties regulation, and even corporate taxation. The classic use of the
restriction occurs in close corporations that do not want their shares
to go outside the original group or at least to persons not approved
by the directors or shareholders. It can serve an ancillary purpose
for electing "small business corporations" under Subchapter S of
the Internal Revenue Code, for it is the most reliable way to insure
that, during the period when the election is to remain in effect, there
will be no more than ten individual shareholders-one of the pre-
requisites for claiming Subchapter S's special treatment.1 26
More recently, varieties of transfer restrictions, with or without
a so-called "stop transfer" notice with the issuer or its transfer
agent,127 have been used by large corporations seeking to preserve
intact some exemption under federal (and occasionally state) securi-
ties statutes. Often the issuer will "privately place" an issue of
securities, typically with some institutional investor, rather than
make a public offering,22 and it will wish to prevent the "placee"
'" G.S. § 25-8-207(1), following the rule of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-77 (1965), and of the provisions of the corpora-
tion law, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-59 (general rule), -60(a) (record date),
-62(a) (notice of meetings), and -60(b) (dividends and other distributions).
112 G.S. § 25-8-204 is, of course, not limited to stock, but applies to all
securities. Almost always the question arises in connection with proposed
or consummated stock transfers, but it could be equally important in the
case of, say, bonds convertible into stock.
I" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (a) requires that the corporation not
have more than ten shareholders, all of whom are natural persons or an
estate, and none of whom are nonresident aliens.
"' See G.S. § 25-8-403. This is discussed in text accompanying notes
254-64 infra.
"'l Section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. §
77d(1) (1964), exempts from registration "transactions by an issuer not
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from selling the securities to the public and thereby retroactively
impose on the issuer possible liability under state and federal statutes
for sale of unregistered securities. The restriction may also be use-
ful in connection with an offering that must be confined to a single
state to avoid federal registration, by preventing local purchasers
from reselling the shares outside the state and thereby destroying
the intrastate exemption. 29 So, too, the issuer may be concerned
to see that a so-called "control person" does not bring about a sale
of its shares without registration.3' Accordingly, issuers often
stamp certificates with a legend such as:
The shares represented by this certificate have not been regis-
tered under the Securities Act of 1933. The shares have been
acquired for investment and may not be pledged or hypothecated,
and may not be sold or transferred in the absence of an effective
Registration Statement for the shares under the Securities Act
of 1933, or an opinion of counsel for the Company that regis-
tration is not required under said Act.1 31
Even if it would not deter a holder from attempting to sell the
stamped certificate, a broker would hesitate to participate in such
a sale; the purchaser would take the certificate with notice of the
restriction and would likely be unable to induce the transfer agent
to register the shares in his name. A restriction of this sort has
been held valid.'3 2 The North Carolina court in Altman v. Ameri-
can Foods, Inc.' also was faced with such a restriction, imposed
involving any public offering." Somewhat similar exemptions appear in
state "blue sky" statutes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-4 (1965).
.2 Section 3(a) (11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 75, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(11) (1964), exempts from registration "any security which is a
part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single
State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident
and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing
business within such State or Territory."
"' Under § 2(11)- of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(11) (1964), a person who controls an issuer (e.g., a corporation) is
himself treated as an issuer, and those who sell for him become statutory
underwriters. For a definition of the term "control," see Rule 405 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission under
the Securities Act of 1933.
... Quoted from Israels, When Corporations Go Public 22-23 (1962).
See the form of restriction in Altman v. American Foods, Inc., 262 N.C.
671, 672, 138 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1964).
1. General Dev. Corp. v. Catlin, 139 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (sustaining corporation's right to stamp stock certificates with a
legend that the shares were purchased "for investment and not with a view
to distribution").132262 N.C. 671, 138 S.E.2d 526 (1964).
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to preserve the intrastate exemption for certain securities, but did
not have to pass on its validity. In that case, the court held that
a purchaser of the restricted shares could rescind the transaction on
a showing that the corporation had failed to disclose that the shares
would not be registered and would be restricted as to sale; "its
failure to discharge this duty made the stock it tendered [the pur-
chaser] substantially different from the stock it had agreed to sell
him."'34 Arguably, the court has impliedly approved the reason-
ableness of such a restriction in granting rescission instead of in-
validating the restriction and recognizing a right to disregard it
and sell the shares.
The Code provision'3r leaves the substantive validity of stock
transfer restriction untouched. All it does is to provide, as did the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act counterpart,'36 that any transfer re-
striction "otherwise lawful" must be "noted conspicuously on the
security," although actual knowledge will be legally equivalent to
the notation. Thus, a restriction, even though impeccably legal the
common law (such as a first-option arrangement or a buy-and-sell
agreement) will fail unless it complies with the Code formalities;
but a restriction that is doubtlessly voidable at common law (for
instance, an absolute restraint on alienation of shares) would gain
nothing simply because it is "noted conspicuously" on the certificate.
Substantive validity of any proposed restriction must be measured
under local corporation and property rules governing restraints on
alienation.13 7 Even though a restriction is "noted conspicuously" as
the Code requires, it is also important that the restrictions appear
in the articles of incorporation and perhaps also in a written agree-
ment among shareholders so that even if the provision in the articles
is modified, the written agreement will stand unless all parties con-
sent to its modification. 138
118 Id. at 675, 138 S.E.2d at 530.G.S. § 25-8-204.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-89 (1965).
1 North Carolina is fortunate in recognizing a broader spectrum of
stock transfer restrictions than most states. Besides first options and buy-
and-sell agreements, Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744
(1921), upheld as reasonable a requirement that directors of a corporation
consent to a proposed sale of shares, at least where the directors had come
forward with other purchasers at the same price as offered to the proposed
seller. The best study of stock transfer restrictions is found in 2 0'NEAL,
CLOSE CoRPoRATIONs: LAW AND PRACTICE 1-80 (1958).
L" G.S. § 25-8-204 does not apply to transfer restrictions other than
those imposed by the issuer. Thus a private agreement among shareholders
[Vol. 44
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III. PURCHASERS AND TRUE OWNERS: RIGHTS INTER SE
The Code treatment of disputes between the true owner and the
purchaser of a security can be briefly stated; the balance of this
part of the article merely elaborates these propositions. Adverse
claims to a security-that is, property interests opposed to those of
the transferee' 3 9 -are extinguished if the security is held by a bona
fide purchaser.1 4 Like the holder in due course of commercial paper,
the bona fide purchaser (1) gives value, (2) purchases in good faith,
(3) has no notice of adverse claim, and (4) acquires the security
through a formally perfect transfer. 4 1 If the security is in bearer
form, delivery alone suffices. 142 If it is in registered form, the secu-
rity must be indorsed either in blank or specially by one who is an
"appropriate person"1 43 as of the date of signing,' and it must be
delivered.' 45 Even though the transfer is "wrongful," e.g., in breach
of trust or without a necessary court order or the like, the transfer
is effective if an "appropriate person" indorsed.'46 The transferee
may be a bona fide purchaser if he meets the other requisites for
that status; and, as we see later, the purchaser may compel the
issuer to recognize him as owner by registering transfer of the secu-
rity into the purchaser's name.1 4 But if, instead of a merely wrong-
ful transfer, the indorsement is "unauthorized' 14 -usually because
need not be "noted conspicuously" on the certificate, although it would be
good practice to do so in order to give notice to any person taking the
security in violation of the agreement.
... See G.S. § 25-8-301(1) for the definition of "adverse claim" as in-
cluding "a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a partic-
ular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the security";
the adjective "adverse" is an undefined term. Compare the similar defini-
tion of "claim of beneficial interest" in the Simplification Act, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 32-14(2) (Supp. 1965).
1 0 G.S. § 25-8-301(2). Pre-Code law was the same. See cases cited in
G.S. § 25-8-301, N.C. comment, especially Scottish Bank v. Atkinson, 245
N.C. 563, 96 S.E.2d 837 (1957) (Stock Transfer Act).
... This paraphrases the definition of bona fide purchaser in G.S. § 25-
8-302. The formal requisites of a bona fide purchaser who may cut off
claims, and of the "purchaser for value and without notice" who may
extinguish issuer defenses, G.S. § 25-8-202(1), are the same except that the
bona fide purchaser definition adds the language concerning a formally per-
fect transfer by delivery or by indorsement and delivery.
1'2 G.S. § 25-8-302.
142 G.S. §§ 25-8-302, -308(1)
14 G.S. § 25-8-308(6).
G.S. §§ 25-8-302, -309 (indorsement without delivery).
1
,
0G.S. §§ 25-8-302, -308(1), -315(1).G.S. § 25-8-401.
... As defined in G.S. § 25-1-201(43).
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forged-the transfer is ineffective despite indorsement and de-
livery,'49 and the "adverse claim" of the true owner will prevail,
unless, as we later see, the issuer has in fact registered transfer
into the innocent purchaser's name and he has received a new cer-
tificate in his name, 5' in which case the issuer remains absolutely
liable to the true owner.'51 It is of central importance to grasp
this distinction between the transfer that is wrongful because the
indorsement is "unauthorized" and the transfer that is wrongful
for reasons other than an "unauthorized" indorsement, for on this
distinction hang most of the relevant law and prophets.
In this part of the article we examine the Code treatment of
rights among various claimants of a security; in the following sec-
tion we consider claimants' rights against the issuer-transfer agent
who holds a strategic position because of his traditional trustee-like
obligation to police the rightfulness of all securities transfers-an
obligation much modified by the Code and by several predecessor
statutes of more specialized application.
Both here and later, we chiefly look to problems arising out of
transfer of securities in registered form. Bearer-form securities are
less important than those in registered form if only because all
American shares are in registered form. 5 ' Moreover, bearer-form
securities are transferred by delivery alone; such few problems as
they raise are dealt with when we examine Code concepts of "de-
livery." Thus, the primary focus of the article is on securities in
registered form.
A. Indorsements
1. Fori.-If the security is in registered form, an indorsement
is essential to complete the transfer between the transferor and
140 G.S. §§ 25-8-311, -315(2).
100 In particular, see G.S. § 25-8-311(a).
151 G.S. §§ 25-8-311(b), -404(2).
"2Apparently bearer bonds are less favored today. When one large
bond issue gave bondholders an option of bearer or registered bonds, 80%
of the buyers chose the latter. Apparently, institutional investors in a
"private placement" prefer a single registered security over coupon bonds.
Efficiency and cost savings are sometimes suggested as reasons that both
issuers and banks now back the trend to fully registered bonds. Although
at one time registered bonds sold at a slight discount from their coupon
counterparts, apparently reflecting some vague feeling that registered bonds
might be less freely negotiable, one prominent figure at the time predicted




transferee, at least so as to constitute the transferee a bona fide
purchaser. 53 Indeed, even though the security has been delivered
to the transferee, the latter cannot become a bona fide purchaser
until indorsement is furnished, but the purchaser may compel the
seller to furnish the necessary indorsement.' 54 Not only is the in-
dorsement necessary to perfect the transfer between the parties, but
also to enable the purchaser to have the issuer register the transfer
into his name. Since the transfer agent will properly refuse registra-
tion without the indorsement of the owner,'55 the purchaser may
compel the seller to furnish the indorsement to him with this "req-
uisite which may be [and clearly is] necessary to obtain registra-
tion of the transfer of the security."' 56
So far as the form of indorsement is concerned, it may be either
special or in blank 57 as is true of commercial paper.'58 Unlike com-
mercial paper,'59 however, a security may be duly indorsed on a
separate unattached document,'160 and, indeed, sometimes a man of
caution will send a security forward without signing the "stock
power" on the back of the certificate, and separately mail the docu-
ment formally transferring it-a practice consistent with the Code.
2. Effect.-In another respect, indorsing a security is different
from indorsing commercial paper. Unless indorsed without recourse,
the indorser of commercial paper undertakes to pay the instrument
if it is dishonored and due process on dishonor are taken.' 6 ' Al-
253 G.S. § 25-8-302.
1" G.S. § 25-8-307. As a consequence, a purchaser may receive notice of
an adverse claim between delivery and indorsement, and since bona fide-
purchaser status is fixed as of the indorsement date, the delay may preclude
the purchaser from becoming a bona fide purchaser and thus prevailing
over the true owner. In that case, the purchaser (if he gave value) would
have a right over on the transferor's warranty that the transfer is "effective
and rightful," i.e., is not subject to adverse claims. G.S. § 25-8-306(2) (a).
Presumably, if the unindorsed but already delivered security carried a so-
called "indorsement guarantee," see G.S. § 25-8-312(2), the purchaser would
have a right against the guarantor since this warranty runs "to any person
taking or dealing with the security in reliance on the guarantee." G.S. §
25-8-312(3).
'r G.S. §§ 25-8-401 (1) (a) ("the issuer is under a duty to register the
transfer as requested if (a) the security is indorsed by the appropriate
person or persons"), -404(1) (a) ("the issuer is not liable to the owner
... as a result of the registration of a transfer of a security if (a) there
were on or with the security the necessary indorsements").
150 G.S. § 25-8-316.
'57 G.S. § 25-8-308(2).
'5 G.S. § 25-3-204.
'° G.S. § 25-3-202(2).
100 G.S. § 25-8-308(1).
101 G.S. § 25-3-414(1).
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though never previously expressed in prior statutes, the common
understanding was that indorsing a security was equivalent to a
qualified indorsement, even though the transferor did not so limit
his liability. Obviously, the seller of a bond would not wish to
guarantee the issuer's payment of interest and principal. Accord-
ingly, the Code expressly states that indorsement implies no under-
standing as to honoring the security, "unless otherwise agreed," 1 2
an unlikely event.
3. "Appropriate Person."-In order effectively to transfer a
registered form security it must be indorsed, in the words of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, "by the person appearing by the
certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby"' 3 or,
as the Code expresses the same idea, by the "appropriate person.'
'164
The Code then gives a comprehensive list of "appropriate persons"
whose signatures on the security are effective as indorsements. 10
The most obvious and common situation is the person "specified
by the security or by special indorsement to be entitled to the securi-
ty,' '16 i.e., the true owner of the security. Therefore, the security
may specify an individual, a partnership, a corporation, or fiduciaries
of various sorts and descriptions. If so, the person named in the se-
curity, "or his successor," is an "appropriate person" to indorse. For
instance, a certificate names "John Smith, trustee of a trust under
the will of Samuel Settlor." Smith is an "appropriate person" to
indorse the security. If Smith has been succeeded by Centerville
National Bank as trustee, that bank is also an "appropriate person"
to indorse. And if Centerville National Bank merges into Central
Carolina Bank and Trust Company, the latter bank would be an
"appropriate person" to indorse. These latter examples also point
up the fact that, in many instances, an indorsement will be by agent,
and the Code recognizes the appropriateness of the "authorized
agent" of anyone who is otherwise an "appropriate person."' 67 Ac-
cordingly, Central Carolina's indorsement by the duly authorized
trust officer would clearly be sufficient under the Code. This is none-
theless true with holdings of securities by corporations other than
banks. In an analogous situation, an executor, administrator,
102 G.S. § 25-8-308(4).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-80 (1965).
2' G.S. § 25-8-308(l).10 G.S. § 25-8-308(3).
'0o G.S. § 8-308(3) (a).
107 G.S. § 25-8-308(3) (g).
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guardian, or similar fiduciary is an "appropriate person" to sign a
security when the individual owner is unable to act because of his
death, incompetence, infancy, etc."'8
The "appropriateness" of a person to indorse a security is de-
termined when he signs and is not affected by subsequent events. 6 '
Thus, if a security registered in the name of Henry Harris is in-
dorsed by Albert Atkins, his authorized agent, on January 1,
termination of the agency on January 2 does not invalidate the
indorsement and Atkins' signature must be accepted by the transfer
agent as that of an "appropriate person" when it is presented for
registration of transfer on January 15. So, too, the removal of a
trustee immediately after he indorsed a security does not affect the
"appropriateness" of his indorsement. Of course, such events as
termination of the agency or removal of the trustee may make the
delivery of the security wrongful, but this is a different problem.
So long as the security has been indorsed by a person appropriate
at that time, it is effective as an indorsement, and a bona fide pur-
chaser will extinguish the claims of the "true owner."
If some signature other than that of an "appropriate person"
appears on the security, it will be ineffective. Thus, a purchaser of
shares under contract would properly refuse to take shares naming
Henry T. Smith, Sr. as owner if indorsed "Henry T. Smith, Jr.,"
or "Mary Ann (Mrs. Henry T. Smith, Sr.)"; nor would one likely
accept shares naming "First National Bank, as Trustee for Ezra
Mannon," if the certificate was indorsed "Ezra Mannon." But even
if a certificate so defectively indorsed got that far, the transfer agent
would have no duty to register the transfer into the purchaser's
name17 0 and in refusing would incur no liability.
17
'
20" G.S. § 25-8-308(3) (d). The other subsections of G.S. § 25-8-308(3)
state convenient rules for special situations. Thus, if shares are held by
Smith and Jones as co-trustees, and Smith just died, Jones would still be
an "appropriate person" to indorse even though a successor to Smith has
not yet been named. G.S. § 25-8-308(3) (c). A special rule is stated for
tenants by the entirety or with right of survivorship, so that the survivor
may appropriately indorse. G.S. § 25-8-308(3) (e). Also under G.S. 25-8-
308(3) (f), "a person having power to sign under applicable law or con-
trolling instrument" is an "appropriate person." The Code comments cite
as an example a "small estate statute" which authorizes a widow to transfer
securities of her dead husband without administration proceedings. G.S. §
25-8-308, comment 4.
160 G.S. § 25-8-308(6).
70 G.S. § 25-8-401(1) (a).
1G.S. § 25-8-404(1) (b).
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I Of course, the signature of an "appropriate person" may be
forged, but here the fact of forgery would be controlling; the in-
dorsement, purportedly that of the "appropriate person," is ineffec-
tive, and reliance by a purchaser or by a transfer agent would not
preclude the true owner from asserting his rights. The concept of
"appropriate person" and "unauthorized indorsement," are not con-
gruent, for an appropriate person's signature may be "unauthor-
ized" in the Code sense, which includes forgery. 2
B. Delivery
1. Concept of Delivery.-Although throughout the Code "de-
livery" carries its basic meaning of "voluntary transfer of posses-
sion,"'173 its content is more complex and subtle as applied to invest-
ment securities than as applied to commercial paper. Delivery alone
transfers bearer-form securities: If a registered-form security has
been indorsed, it is necessary to complete transfer. In a typical
securities transaction, "delivery" of a security will occur several
times. It is useful to work from the simpler to the more complex
procedures, although in each instance we see the root idea of volun-
tary transfer of possession.
(1) S and P (seller and purchaser respectively) are friends and
residents of Chapel Hill. S agrees to sell P 1000 shares of GM
with a view to saving brokerage commissions of nearly 500 dollars.
S indorses and simply hands over to P the indorsed GM certificates.
This is good delivery under the Code, which recognizes physical
transfer as the original elemental form of delivery."
(2) P tells his bank that he would like to have some bank stock.
The bank tells him that although the stock is rarely traded, it usual-
ly hears of any stock available and will let him know. Later the
bank learns that S's estate wishes to sell 200 shares, notifies P, and
gets his approval to buy. S's executor indorses and delivers the
certificates to the bank. Under the Code this is good delivery to
the purchaser since "a person designated by him [has] acquire[d]
possession" of the security ;175 physical transfer by the executor to
172 The two ideas come together in a confusing sort of way in consider-
ing when an "authorized agent" is an "appropriate person."
1. G.S. § 25-1-201(14).
17' G.S. § 25-8-313(1) (a). S also fulfills his duty of delivery. G.S. §
25-8-314(2).
178 G.S. § 25-8-313(1) (a). For Code purposes a bank may be a "broker,"
G.S. § 25-8-303, in securities transactions for customers.
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the bank fulfills S's duty. of delivery under the contract of sale.'
(3) The preceding transaction, although somewhat unusual,
resembles many over-the-counter trades. If P had ordered his
broker to obtain the bank stock, delivery to the purchaser would
be complete when the broker acquired possession of the security
indorsed to or issued in the name of the purchaser,177 and the seller's
duty of delivery would also be completed at that point."' Further-
more, if the security were then lost or destroyed, P would bear the
risk.
(4.) The transaction can now be made more complicated (and
more typical). S orders his broker in Charlotte to sell 1000 shares
of GM on the New York Stock Exchange, while simultaneously P
in Asheville orders his broker to buy 1000 GM shares. The chances
are remote that P will get S's certificate, but if it were to happen
it would involve several acts of delivery. (a) In all events, S will
deliver the certificate duly indorsed to his broker, the "selling
broker," thus completing S's Code duty of delivery.'7 1 (b) Con-
ceivably but unlikely, the selling broker might deliver this very
security to the "buying broker," in which case the former's duty of
delivery is complete under the Code.' 80 (c) Even less likely, the
buying broker would deliver the certificate to P who would later
present it to the issuer or its transfer agent for registration of trans-
fer into P's name.
(5) While this illustrates multiple deliveries, it is unlikely that
either P or his broker would get S's old certificate. In a typical
exchange transaction, S will deliver his certificate to his broker in-
dorsed in blank, thereby fulfilling his (S's) duty of delivery.' 8'
The selling broker will probably have the shares represented by
this certificate registered into the name of a nominee acceptable
under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. 8 ' It is this
nominee certificate which is normally transferred between selling
and buying brokers and among any correspondent brokers standing
between them. Under the Code, S's own broker and any corre-
176 G.S. § 25-8-314(2).
:7 G.S. § 25-8-313(1) (b).
17 G.S. § 25-8-314(1) (a).
'
1 9 G.S. § 25-8-314(1) (a).280 G.S. § 25-8-314(1) (b).
281G.S. § 25-8-314(1) (a).
1. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH. RULEs 199-201. See also Israels, Investment
Securities Problems-Article 8 of the UCC, 11 How. L.J. 120, 123-25
(1965).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
spondent brokers acting for S fulfill their respective duties of de-
livery when the security "or a like security" comes into the
possession of the buying broker or someone acting for the buying
broker."8 3 Given this sequence of events, it is improbable that S's
certificate will travel through the entire transaction, since (a) it
will likely be registered out of his name at an early stage, and (b)
the selling broker (or a correspondent acting for him) need not
deliver the nominee certificate obtained by the selling broker but
instead a "like security," since under the Code securities of the
same issuer and same class, e.g., GM common, are treated as
fungible." 4
In this typical transaction, at what point does delivery to the
purchaser occur? This depends upon arrangements between P and
the buying broker. Since P is entitled to a certificate issued to him
in his name, delivery to P would occur when such a certificate is
received by P's broker3 5 But if P's broker has custody of P's
securities, holding them in "street name," the act of delivery to P
occurs when the broker sends P a confirmation of the purchase and
"by book entry or otherwise identifies a specific security in the
broker's possession as belonging to the purchaser."'86
(6) The Code also recognizes recent developments in processing
the increasing number of stock transactions through stock clearance
procedures analogous to familiar check clearing practices.117 Under
this arrangement securities are held by a "clearing corporation" 88
or a "custodian bank,""" either in bearer form or indorsed in blank
or registered in the name of the clearing corporation or custodian
bank."' Securities may then be transferred among members of the
clearing corporation simply upon making entries on the clearing
corporation's books, and, indeed, entries may be made on a net
basis.'' Such a transfer of securities by book entry constitutes
delivery to the purchaser of the security.' Hence, delivery can
13 G.S. § 25-8-314(1) (b).
"' See G.S. § 25-1-201(17) defining "fungible" to include "securities of
which any unit is, by ... usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like
unit."18 G.S. § 25-8-313(1) (b).
180 G.S. § 25-8-313(1) (c).
... This is recognized by G.S. § 25-8-320.
108 G.S. § 25-8-102(3).
1g0 G.S. § 25-8-102(4).
100 G.S. § 25-8-320(1).
101 G.S. §§ 25-8-320(1), (2).
2
0 2 G.S. §§ 25-8-313(1)(e), 
-320(3).
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occur at an early step in the transfer proceedings and since, by
hypothesis, it has already been indorsed, the purchaser may, at that
time, become a bona fide purchaser of his security or at least of an
interest in a fungible bulk of securities. The New York Stock Ex-
change established the Stock Clearing Corporation, to which many
Exchange members belong, and its operations have become largely
automated. 1
3
2. Effect of Delivery.-Under the Code, delivery is necessary
to give the purchaser bona fide-purchaser status.' Moreover, after
delivery, the purchaser is "owner" of the securities.' 95 This may be
significant if they are held by a broker who becomes insolvent, for
the purchaser-owner may then be able to reclaim his securities
rather than see them become a part of the broker's insolvent estate.' 0Y
The purchaser is also the "owner" of a proportionate property
interest if his GM shares are retained by his broker along with
the GM shares of other customers and these interests are repre-
sented by a single large denomination GM certificate in "street
name."' 97 Moreover, the purchaser is "holder"' s of the securities
delivered to him even though they remain in the broker's custody.09
C. Unauthorized Indorsement v. Wrongful Transfer
1. Unauthorized Indorsemnent.-As a technical matter, under
the Code one who has the misfortune to acquire a security with a
forged or otherwise "unauthorized" indorsement may be a bona
'93 See CCH N.Y. STOCK EXcH. GuimE 3001-324 (1959) for rules of
the Stock Clearing Corp. Last summer the Exchange announced that by
April 1966 "its computerized system for reducing physical delivery of stock
certificates among member firms" will be "in full operation." Wall Street
Journal, June 10, 1965.
19' G.S. § 25-8-302. Delivery of any security of itself gives the purchaser
whatever "rights in the security which his transferor had or had actual
authority to convey." G.S. § 25-8-301(1). Of course, if the security is in
registered form, the purchaser may compel an indorsement. G.S. §§ 25-8-307,
-316.
1-9 G.S. § 25-8-313(2).
"go G.S. § 25-8-313, comment 3.
197G.S. § 25-8-313(2).
198 G.S. § 25-1-201(20).
29G.S. § 25-8-313(2). If shares are margined, only the broker is
"holder" of the securities (obviously necessary so that he can sell the shares
if necessary), although the purchaser is still "owner." See G.S. §§ 25-8-
313 (1) (d), -313 (2).
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fide purchaser,2 00 but even as to such a purchaser the demand of the
true owner will prevail since he may reclaim the security, or obtain
a new one in its place. In short, the bona fide purchaser loses.
There are two possible methods of solution, but neither is wholly
effective, however.
(a) If B the purchaser must restore the certificate, he may be
able to recover on warranties.2 ' Clearly, one of his warranty rights
against the transferor-that the "transfer is effective and right-
ful"-would cover an unauthorized indorsement.1 2 However, the
recovery may not be worth much. Certainly, the seller, who we
assume forged the indorsement, would be an unlikely source of re-
covery. If the transfer went through the organized markets-and
assuming that the forger had not been caught earlier-recovery
against the purchaser's broker would also be improbable, since the
broker as immediate transferor warrants only that "his transfer is
effective and rightful" and that "he knows no fact which might
impair the validity of the security."2 ' A possible second warranty
recovery, however, does appear more promising. If the security
goes through the organized markets, it will routinely carry a signa-
ture guarantee confirming that the signature is genuine, the signer
was an appropriate person to indorse, and had legal capacity to
sign.2"4 Since this warranty runs to "any person taking . . . the
security in reliance on the guarantee" and exacts liability "to such
persons for any loss resulting from the breach of the warranties,"20 5
the purchaser would be able to recover; and since signature guaran-
tees are normally given only by responsible institutions, recovery
should be good.200 This is suggested as the proper construction of
the Code provision; although "purchasers" are not mentioned, and
the signature guarantee chiefly protects the transfer agent, the term
"OSee G.S. § 25-8-315(2), which states that if the transfer is wrongful
because of an unauthorized indorsement, the true owner may reclaim the
security "even from a bona fide purchaser. .. "
.0. See G.S. § 25-8-306(2) for the transferor's warranties, which are
similar to those under the Stock Transfer Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-85(1965).
202 G.S. § 25-8-306(2) (a).
20 G.S. § 25-8-306(2) (c).
"'" These are the three warranties of the signature guarantor. G.S. §
25-8-312(1).2"00 G.S. § 25-8-312(3).
.0. Under G.S. § 25-8-402(2) the transfer agent may always require a
signature guarantee "signed by or on behalf of a person reasonably believed
by the issuer to be responsible."
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"any person ''2°7 would include a purchaser, although not the true
owner.
208
(b) The bona fide purchaser may prevail over the true owner
in the single situation0 9 where he presents the security to the trans-
fer agent for registration into his own name, and thereafter receives
a new certificate in his name.210 The theory is that (i) the transfer
agent will likely catch forgeries if anyone can, and (ii) if the forged
certificate can pass muster with the transfer agent, the purchaser
who receives a new certificate should keep it. In fact what happens
is that at this point the liability of transfer agent is substituted for
that of purchaser, so that the purchaser may keep his new security21 '
but the transfer agent is absolutely liable to give the true owner a
new security.2 2 Since the old security will carry a signature guar-
antee, the institution guaranteeing the security ultimately carries the
risk, which in turn can be insured against.
2. Wrongful Transfer.-Different consequences follow if the in-
dorsement is authorized but the transfer is otherwise wrongful. For
instance, an agent may be an "appropriate person" and also "author-
ized" to indorse a security,213 but not privileged to deliver it, e.g.,
to his own bank to secure his own loan, or to a broker to sell for
him, etc. Similarly, a trustee may be an "appropriate person" and
"authorized" to indorse a security in a fiduciary name, 1 4 but privi-
leged to deliver it only on court order or in accordance with trust
terms, etc. The Code view is that defective authority to deliver a se-
curity is less serious than an unauthorized indorsement. According-
ly, a bona fide purchaser takes free and clear of all "adverse claims"
to the security,21 5 such as that of the principal or the trust bene-
ficiary or a successor trustee. This does not depend upon the pur-
207 G.S. § 25-8-312(1). "'Person' includes an individual or an organi-
zation," G.S. § 25-1-201(30), and "organization" includes corporations,
trusts, estates, partnerships, and several other entities or communities of
interest, G.S. § 25-1-201(28).
21' Love v. Pennsylvania R.R., 200 F. Supp. 561 (E.P. Pa. 1961) ; Eulette
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 101 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. App.
1958).
... Except that a true owner may have ratified an unauthorized indorse-
ment or otherwise precluded himself from asserting its effectiveness. G.S.
§ 25-8-311 (preamble).
2"0 G.S. §§ 25-8-311(a), -315(2).
211 G.S. § 25-8-311(a).
212 G.S. §§ 25-8-311(b), -404(2).
213 G.S. § 25-8-308(3) (g).
214 G.S. § 25-8-308(3) (a).
2 r G.S. § 25-8-315(1).
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
chaser's receiving a new security in his own name; indeed, as a
bona fide purchaser, he is entitled to registration of transfer,21 and
the transfer agent would be liable for refusing to do so.
2 17
What, then, are the rights of the "true owner," the one asserting
"adverse claims ?" In general, they are against the wrongdoer, e.g.,
the defaulting agent or trustee. The true owner obviously cannot
claim under warranties of the seller"'8 or the signature guarantor, 19
nor would the wrongdoer's broker be liable to the true owner.' 0
Thus, so long as the indorsement is authorized and by an appro-
priate person, the Code elevates its policy of promoting free transfer
of securities over the interests of the true owner.
This is best illustrated by the fiduciary-owned security. Under
the Code, neither purchaser nor any brokers need inquire whether a
transfer is rightful even though they have notice that the security
is registered or indorsed in the name of a fiduciary.2 ' Thus, the
purchaser may simply assume that the fiduciary is acting rightfully
and need not raise doubts. The purchaser's protection is limited by
(a) any knowledge that the fiduciary transaction is for the fidu-
ciary's personal benefit or otherwise in breach of duty, 2 2 or (b)
the overriding Code obligation of "good faith," that is, "honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 223
IV. PURCHASERS AND TRUE OWNERS: RIGHTS TO
REGISTRATION OF TRANSFER
Part IV of Article 8 states for the first time in any uniform
statutes of general application the duties and liabilities of the
issuer224 in registering transfers of securities. The extent to which
21' G.S. § 25-8-401(e).
3 7 G.S. § 25-8-404(2).218 G.S. § 25-8-306(2).
210 G.S. § 25-8-312. See note 208 supra.
2a" G.S. § 25-8-318.
"2 G.S. § 25-8-304(2).
"2 G.S. § 25-8-304(2). The Simplification Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-
20(a) (Supp. 1965), is in accord.
222 G.S. § 25-1-201(19). See Israels, Investment Securities Problem-
Article 8 of the UCC, 11 How. L.J. 120, 140-41 (1965), for a good hypo-
thetical fact situation illustrating this point.
"'Throughout this part of the article, I have used the terms "issuer"
and "transfer agent" interchangeably when discussing transfer registration.
This accords with G.S. § 25-8-201(3), which form defines "issuer" as a
"person on those behalf transfer books are maintained." See also G.S. §
25-8-406(1), stating the duties of a transfer agent, registrar, or like person
acting for an issuer in registering transfers of securities.
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it alters prior law is less in North Carolina than elsewhere, since
North Carolina previously enacted statutes facilitating transactions
in fiduciary-owned securities, first by adopting in 1923 the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act225 and then in 1959 the Uniform Act for Simplifica-
tion of Fiduciary Security Transfers ("Simplification Act")*226
Essentially, Part IV of Article 8 adapts the Simplification Act's
theory to all securities transfers, whether or not owned by fidu-
ciaries, and to that extent changes existing law outside of fiduciary
security transfers. As to fiduciary security transfers, the Code and
Simplification Act are substantively compatible although confusing-
ly divergent in language; while the earlier act remains on the books
(as recommended by the Code Commissioners), it can peacefully
co-exist with the Code.2 27
A. The Common-Law Background
1. Transfer on the Books of the Corporation.-Many securities,
especially stock, recite that they may be transferred on the books
of the corporation (the issuer). This implied, and the theory came
to be, that until the corporation's books were changed to show the
new owner, the transfer of the shares was somehow incomplete.
This logically implied that "transfer on the books" meant more than
merely registering a completed transfer, but was integral to obtain-
ing full and complete title to the shares.22 s Characteristic language
on stock certificates reflected this. The seller "assigned" his shares
and appointed the purchaser (or someone else) as his "attorney"
to bring about the "transfer" of the shares on the corporation's
books. This terminology carries forward today so that, in the lingo
of transfer agents and of some statutes such as the Simplification
Act, a security is still "assigned" 229 by its owner and then "trans-
ferred" 2 0 when the corporation's books are changed to reflect the
new owner.
26 In particular, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-4 (1950).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-14 to -24 (Supp. 1965).
227 G.S. § 25-10-104(2).
.28 Of course, even today before stock has been registered into the pur-
chaser's name, the "record title" still lodges in the seller who holds that
record title in trust for the purchaser and subject to his instructions, in-
cluding an obligation to give the purchaser a proxy.
.2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-14(1) (Supp. 1965) (definition of "assign-
ment").
280 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-14(7) (Supp. 1965) (definition of "transfer"
as "a change on the books of the corporation in the registered ownership of
a security").
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Despite the continued use of traditional terms, the underlying
meaning has gradually changed. Since the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, delivery of the certificate duly indorsed has conveyed the seller's
complete interest in the shares, whether or not this event has yet
been recognized by the corporation. 31 This reveals more clearly
the real meaning of (1) "transfer on the books of the corporation,"
and (2) the issuer's duty in connection with this act. Under the
Stock Transfer Act 23 2 and corporation law,23 3 the issuer may ex-
clusively rely on its records to determine stock ownership. This is
to accommodate the issuer who must know, at any given time, to
whom it must send out notices, whose vote or proxy it must honor,
and who is entitled to dividends or interest or other distributions.
Only collaterally is this intended to benefit the owner of the shares,
although usually what is good for GM as issuer is good for the
GM shareholder-to apply a famous aphorism in a more restricted
context. Viewed this way, "transfer on the books" is logically
immaterial to the actual transfer or conveyance of a property inter-
est. Rather it is merely a matter of recording-"registering"-the
transfer that has already occurred (if the seller has indorsed and
delivered the certificate to the buyer or his agent), or is yet to
occur (where the seller, or his agent, presents the certificate to the
transfer agent for registration out of the seller's name, before sale-
as in typical exchange transactions). So regarded, the issuer does
not "transfer" the security in any meaningful sense. What he does
is to record a transfer, completed or projected as the case may be.
Hence "transfer on the books" has nothing more to do with this
transfer than recording a deed has to do with the validity of the
conveyance between the parties.
Accordingly, the Code has adopted language that accurately re-
flects what is going on. When the seller, an "appropriate person,"
indorses and delivers the stock certificate, he "transfers" it; when
the certificate is presented and a new one issued in another name,
the issuer or transfer agent "registers transfer."
2. The Legal Rules.-What are the issuer's duties and liabili-
ties in connection with "registration of transfer?" Earlier we dis-
2' This was clearly recognized by Scottish Bank v. Atkinson, 245 N.C.
563, 96 S.E.2d 837 (1957).
..2 N.C. Gray. STAT. § 55-77 (1965); the same is true under the Code
G.S. § 25-8-207.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-59 (1965).
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tinguished transfers vitiated by an unauthorized indorsement and
those impaired only by some defect in authority to deliver. For
the issuer (or transfer agent) the problem is the scope of its duty
to pursue adverse claims to a security presented for registration.
The issuer had no duty of inquiry under early American decisions, 234
which followed English cases,235 now codified into positive law.236
The issuer did remain liable for registering transfer when an in-
dorsement was forged or otherwise unauthorized, but not when
transfer was wrongful only because of some breach of trust or like
duty.
An 1848 leading case2T decisively altered American law by
broadly declaring that a corporation is
the custodian of the shares of stock, and clothed with power
sufficient to protect the rights of everyone interested, from un-
authorized transfers; it is a trust placed in the hands of the
corporation for the protection of individual interests, and like
every other trustee, it is bound to execute the trust with proper
diligence and care, and is responsible for any injury sustained
by its negligence or misconduct.238
The case held a corporation liable for breach of this trust in register-
ing transfer of securities contrary to the provisions of a probated
will when it had constructive notice of the will's terms. North Caro-
lina decisions 239 adhered to this doctrine, which supplanted the older
view, so that the corporation was obligated at its peril to judge the
rightfulness of any particular transfer by a fiduciary or other.24 °
Over the years North Carolina gradually eased the case-law
rule, one of the most undesirable side-effects of which was to compel
the issuer to overprotect itself by obtaining such extensive docu-
mentation of security transfers that serious delay and expense would
result, at least for fiduciary security transfers.241 The Uniform
2S, Bank of Virginia v. Craig, 6 Leigh (50 Va.) 399 (1835).235Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. Jur. 56, 30 Eng. Rep. 891 (Ch.
1796).
..6 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 117.
"" Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (No.
8581) (C.C.D. Md. 1848), was a decision by Chief Justice Taney on circuit.238 Id. at 1047.
... King v. Richardson, 136 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
777 (1943); Baker v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 173 N.C. 365, 92 S.E. 170(1917); Wooten v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 128 N.C. 119, 38 S.E. 298(1901); Cox v. First Nat'l Bank, 119 N.C. 302, 26 S.E. 22 (1896).
"'In particular, see Baker v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., supra note 239,
stating rules governing particular classes of fiduciaries.
241 Some of the difficulties encountered by issuers and transfer agents
1966]
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Fiduciaries Act relieved issuers and transfer agents of any duty
to "inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his
obligation . . . or to see to the performance of the fiduciary obliga-
tion" and exacted liability only if the issuer registered transfer with
"actual knowledge" of the breach or otherwise in bad faith.242 The
Simplification Act carried this further and expressly relieved issuers
and transfer agents of a general duty to inquire into the fiduciary
relationship,24 authorized issuers to assume without inquiry the
rightfulness of each transfer,244 negated constructive notice from
publicly recorded documents, 45 specified the limited documentation
needed to register a fiduciary security transfer,246 and exonerated
the issuer from liability for acts conforming to the statutory stan-
dards.24 7
The Code simply applies these Simplification Act standards to
every registration of transfer. Issuers continue absolutely liable for
registering transfer on unauthorized (including forged) indorse-
ments but are given full relief from any consequences of registering
a merely wrongful transfer, if they have no duty of inquiry or dis-
charge such strictly limited duty as they may have. Before analyzing
the issuer's duty to register transfer 24' and its possible liabilities for
registering 40 or not registering transfer,25 ° we first note the issuer's
obligation to investigate the rightfulness of transfer25' and its
privilege of demanding "assurances" that indorsements are effec-
tive.252 The strictly limited duty to inquire is the chief survival of
the common-law rules, while "assurances" concerning the indorse-
ments protect the issuer in the only area of absolute liability-
forged indorsements.
are recounted in Conrad, New Deal for Fiduciaries Security Trans-
fers, 56 MicH. L. R~v. 843 (1958).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-4 (1950). This was construed in Carolina Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 168 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1948), to relieve the issuer
in that case from liability for registering a stock transfer by a guardian who
failed to account for the sale proceeds.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-15 (Supp. 1965).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-16(1), (2) (Supp. 1965).
'N.C. GEar. STAT. § 32-16(3) (Supp. 1965).
2'0 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-17, -18 (Supp. 1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-19 (Supp. 1965).
,"G.S. § 25-8-401(1).
,, G.S. § 25-8-404.
,"o G.S. § 25-8-401(2).
" G.S. § 25-8-403.
252 G.S. § 25-8-402.
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B. Issuer's Responsibility: Duty to Inquire
Although the Code continues some issuer liability for register-
ing "merely" wrongful transfers,2 58 it is no longer absolute as under
the case law's trustee theory but turns upon extremely limited duty
to investigate rightfulness. This duty of care is discharged by ob-
serving procedures that the issuer need follow only if it receives
formal notice as to a specified adverse claim concerning a particular
security. It is assumed that all indorsements are effective.
1. Stop Transfer Orders.-Code section 8-403 approves the so-
called "stop transfer notice" which is lodged with an issuer or trans-
fer agent to block registering a security transfer and may be used
for many purposes, including protection of adverse claims.2"4 This
partly duplicates existing provisions of the Simplification Act.2 55
The stop order to be effective, i.e., to evoke the issuer's duty to
inquire, must be written, must be received in time to provide a
reasonable opportunity to act on it before registering transfer, and
must identify the security, the registered owner, the claimant, and
provide the claimant's address.2 56 This all means that the order is
ineffective if (1) it is telephoned to the issuer or otherwise given
orally, (2) is delayed in the mails, although the claimant is not
at fault, or is never received, or (3) is otherwise deficient. These
requirements are reasonable since a stop transfer order can only
be effectively honored if it is a form readily keyed to the issuer's
or transfer agent's records or automated equipment.
Hence, upon due receipt of the order in proper form, the issuer
is liable if it registers transfer without reference to the order. The
issuer also bears the risk, once the order is "received," of filing it
"'That is if the issuer demands and obtains certain excess documenta-
tion. G.S. § 25-8-402(4).
... Such notices are also used to block registration of transfer of securi-
ties issued under some exemption from federal and state securities regulation
statutes, e.g., a "privately placed" issue. Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 81 N.J. Super. 180, 195 A.2d 210 (1963), recognized such a restric-
tion as an adverse claim which could be cut off only in the hands of a
bona fide purchaser without notice of the restriction and held that when
the bona fide-purchaser status of the presenter was uncertain the transfer
agent could refuse registration. See also discussion in text accompanying
notes 125-38 supra.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-18 (Supp. 1965); see also the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Acts, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-73 (Supp. 1965).
256 G.S. § 25-8-403 (1) (a). It is not necessary to furnish the certificate
number.
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or otherwise using the information. 57 Thus, if the Code require-
ments are met, the issuer cannot plead lack of actual knowledge.
Once the duty of inquiry arises, how is it discharged? In gen-
eral by "any reasonable means."25 However, transfer agents will
usually follow a Code-approved routine, which presumably is a com-
plete defense to any contention that the transfer agent did not dis-
charge its duty to inquire. Under this procedure, the transfer agent
notifies the adverse claimant that the security has been presented for
registration, which will occur unless "within thirty days from the
date of mailing the notification" (1) a court of competent jurisdic-
tion issues a restraining order or like process, or (2) the issuer or
transfer agent receives indemnity sufficient to protect it from loss
resulting from the issuer's honoring the adverse claim. 59 Thus, the
issuer may safely register transfer if no restraining order or bond
is forthcoming within thirty days. The Code leaves some uncertain-
ties in this procedure. Does a court of "competent jurisdiction"
refer to any court that might have power to issue such an order,
or does it imply also that venue must be proper and process served
on the issuer? In short, must a North Carolina claimant secure a
New York state or federal court order to restrain Guaranty Trust
Company from registering transfer of certain shares? Also who
would be the necessary parties: certainly the issuer, but what about
the person presenting the security to be registered? Seemingly, the
presenter would not be bound unless it too is a party, although
perhaps the proceeding would be one quasi in rem if the certificate
is in the court's territorial jurisdiction as it would be if the transfer
agent has possession of it and suit is brought in that locality. The
purpose of the proceeding is, of course, to obtain a final determina-
tion of the conflicting claims to the security.
As an alternative to securing a court order, the claimant may
post bond the amount of which must be "sufficient in the issuer's
judgment to protect" it from loss suffered "by complying with the
adverse claim." 2' 6 Furnishing bond contemplates a refusal to regis-
ter transfer, which will usually mean that the presenter will sue
"' See G.S. § 25-1-201(26) for a definition of when "a person 'receives'
a notice or notification. . . ." See G.S. § 25-1-201(27) for the Code rules
concerning circulation of notice, or notification in a "organization," which
is defined in G.S. § 25-1-201(28).
G.S. § 25-8-403(2).
Ibid.
2'0 G.S. § 25-8-403 (2) (b).
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the issuer (or transfer agent). Although the issuer determines the
amount of the bond, it presumably would not act in "good faith"
by demanding an exorbitant indemnity arrangement.
The Code does not specify the duration of the stop order, in
contrast to the six-month period for a stop payment on a check," 1
nor are the time and circumstances when a notice loses effect de-
termined by the Code. 2 Although arguably check stop payment
rules might serve as an analogy,26 it would appear that the absence
of any specified time period implies indefinite effectiveness of a stop
transfer order. The analogy to checks is inapposite, since checks,
as demand instruments, may soon become stale,2 while investment
securities continue in effect indefinitely (most stock, redeemable
shares aside) or for long periods (bonds and debentures). This
argues against any arbitrary cut-off time since lost, stolen or de-
stroyed securities may turn up years later. Nor is it a burdensome
operation to key a stop order into the issuer's records or equipment
and keep it in effect.
2. Inquiry Duty From Documents.-An issuer may also be
charged with notice of adverse claims if it demands documentation
beyond what the Code prescribes. This is supposed to deter issuers
from following their old practices of dragging in every conceivable
document, court order, instrument, opinion of counsel, etc., partic-
ularly for fiduciary security transfers. This is constructive, not
actual, notice "of all matters contained [in the documents] affecting
the transfer." '265 Such a duty of inquiry may be discharged like any
other duty-by notifying the claimant who must procure a restrain-
ing order or give an indemnity bond,266 although the issuer may
have trouble locating and communicating with one or more possible
claimants. The prudent issuer will not seek documents other than
those the Code requires or for any purpose other than the Code
specifies-that is, to determine whether a necessary indorsement is
genuine and effective. 6 ' Unsolicited documents should be returned
2'1 G.S. § 25-4-403 (2) ; the order may be renewed.
62 G.S. § 25-1-201(25).
" This is suggested by Israels, How to Handle Transfers of Stock,
Bonds and Other Investment Securities, 19 Bus. LAw. 90, 106 n.19 (1963).
26 See G.S. § 25-3-503(2).
20 G.S. § 25-8-402(4).
266 G.S. § 25-8-403.
26" G.S. §§ 25-8-402(3) (b), -402(4).
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at once without examination; the issuer incurs no liability by so
doing, but may get into trouble by inspecting or keeping them.
3. Indorsement Guarantee.-Before registering transfer, an
issuer may demand a signature guarantee, which sufficiently guards
against its absolute liability for registering transfer on a forged
signature. It may not demand an indorsement guarantee, which
not only warrants the genuineness of the signature and the appro-
priateness of the signer, but also the rightfulness of the transfer "in
all respects. ' 20 ' However, a presenter may "voluntarily" give the
issuer an indorsement guarantee as an inducement to register trans-
fer,269 although any guarantor should think carefully and charge
sufficiently if he gives such a sweeping assurance. If the issuer then
ignores known adverse claims, it would be liable, but the indorse-
ment guarantor must answer. Thus, the guarantee functions like
the indemnity bond just considered, although here it is procured
by the presenter rather than by the adverse claimant.2 70 However,
if the issuer were to refuse to hold up registration absent an indorse-
ment guarantee, it would probably be liable to the presenter."'
In conclusion, the issuer need not inquire unless it (1) has
received a stop transfer notice, or (2) has demanded and received
excess documentation, but any such duty may be discharged through
any reasonable means, including notice to the adverse claimant who
must get a restraining order or give bond, or by an indorsement
guarantee "voluntarily" furnished by the presenter.
C. Issuer's Protection: Signature Guarantee
Since the issuer remains absolutely liable for registering transfer
on an unauthorized indorsement, it has rights to protection con-
gruent with the scope of its liability. Denied this "assurance," an
issuer may refuse to register transfer without liability to the pre-
senter.272 As stated by the Code, "the issuer may require ... assur-
ance that each necessary indorsement . . . is genuine and effec-
tive .... ",273
20 G.S. § 25-8-312(2).
200 G.S. § 25-8-312, comment 3. One suspects that giving an indorsement
guarantee would be "voluntary" in the sense that Chinese "volunteers"
participated in the Korean War.
270 Thus, in some respects it resembles an indemnity to induce honor of
a draft drawn under a letter of credit. See G.S. § 25-5-113.
271 See G.S. § 25-8-401(2).
2 Ibid.
"' G.S. § 25-8-402(1).
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1. Signature Guarantee.-In all cases the issuer may demand
a guarantee that at the time of signing (1) "the signature was
genuine," i.e., the person who indorsed the certificate "Henry
James" was really Henry James, (2) "the signer was an appro-
priate person to indorse," i.e., the Henry James who indorsed was
the Henry James named in the certificate, and (3) "the signer had
legal capacity to sign," i.e., the Henry James who signed was not
a minor, insane, etc., at the time. 4 The issuer may insist upon
a guarantor "reasonably believed by the issuer to be responsible."2 7
Thus, Chase Manhattan Bank as transfer agent would hardly reject
a signature guaranteed by Manufacturers Hanover but if it was
guaranteed by a North Carolina bank, Chase Manhattan might ac-
cept it or it might also require a second signature guarantee. 70
Standards of responsibility need only be "not manifestly unreason-
able. 27
7
2. Other Assurances.-Besides assurance that the indorsement
is genuine-given by the signature guarantee-the issuer may re-
quire confirmation that the indorsement is "effective, ' 271 typically
when securities carry an agent or fiduciary indorsement.
(a) The signature guarantee itself confirms effectiveness of the
agent's or fiduciary's indorsement, since it warrants that the in-
dorser was an "appropriate person," which may include fiduciaries
of various sorts and "authorized agent[s] ."79 This is illustrated
by Jennie Clarkson Home for Children v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 80
in which Lessels, the treasurer of the Jennie Clarkson home, a
charitable corporation, asked a New York Stock Exchange member
(Gibson) to sell railroad bonds registered in the charity's name.
Lessels learned that the bonds could be sold only if the issuer put
-74 G.S. § 25-8-312(1) (a)-(c). This codifies the antecedent law as stated
in Jennie Clarkson Home for Children v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 182 N.Y.
47, 74 N.E. 571 (1905). See also Simplification Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
32-20(a) (Supp. 1965).
G.S. § 25-8-402(2).
, See NEw YORK STOCK EXCH. Rule 209 requiring signature guarantee
by a "member or member organization" of the Exchange or "by a com-
mercial bank or trust company organized under" federal or New York law
"and having its principal office in the vicinity of the Exchange." The latter
phrase is interpreted by the Exchange to mean the Borough of Manhattan,
south of Fulton Street. 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE 2209 (1962).
277 G.S. § 25-8-402(2).
278 G.S. § 25-8-402(1) (preamble).
-27 G.S. § 25-8-308(3) (b)-(g).
280 182 N.Y. 47, 74 N.E. 571 (1905).
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them into bearer form, for which the issuer required an authenti-
cated resolution of the charity's board of directors. Lessels forged
a resolution and a power of attorney to sell the bonds. The latter
included a signature guarantee which Gibson signed in good faith.
The railroad then issued bearer bonds that were sold, Lessels re-
ceiving the proceeds which he converted to his own use. Neither
the railroad nor Gibson knew of the forgeries. Since the railroad
was absolutely liable for registering transfer, it had a right over
against Gibson, who was held not only to have "guaranteed the
genuineness of the signature of Lessels, who wrote the name of the
corporation over his own name as attorney," but also "that Lessels
had authority to sign the name of the corporation."2 ' Indeed, "the
purpose of the rule [is] to cast upon the broker, who witnesses the
signature, the duty of ascertaining whether the person signing the
name of the corporation had authority to so do, and making the
witness a guarantor that it is the signature of the corporation in
whose name the stock stands."2"2 The Code result is identical:
Lessels would not have been an "appropriate person" to indorse,
and the signature guarantor would have been liable to the railroad.
Since one guaranteeing an agent's or a fiduciary's signature war-
rants authority to indorse, the guarantor may, and usually will, seek
pertinent documentation, e.g., board resolutions, court orders, con-
trolling instruments, etc.288 If the signature guarantor knows the
signor and the circumstances of the transaction or has has confidence
in the signor, it assumes little risk, but it should still insist on proper
papers, which will, incidentally, accompany the security on its jour-
ney to the transfer agent.
(b) Aside from the signature guarantee warranting the agent's
or fiduciary's authority to indorse, the issuer or transfer agent may
itself demand "appropriate assurance of [an agent's] authority to
sign," "appropriate evidence of appointment or incumbency" of a
fiduciary, and so on4 Often documents accompanying the signa-
ture guarantee will suffice, but if not the issuer may demand the
needed documents but only for the purpose of assuring itself of the
signer's authority to indorse, and not to check on rightfulness of
281 Id. at 64, 74 N.E. at 576.
912 Id. at 65, 74 N.E. at 576.
".. The Code says nothing about the kind of documents a signature




transfer." 5 In harmony with the Simplification Act, the Code
elaborates the "appropriate evidence of appointment or incumbency"
of a fiduciary." 6 For a court-appointed or qualified fiduciary, this
means an official certificate dated not more that sixty days from
the date the security is presented for registration. For other fidu-
ciaries, it means a copy of the document (such as the trust instru-
ment or a certificate by a responsible person for other evidence)
showing the fiduciary's appointment or incumbency. Possession of
these documents does not of itself put the issuer on notice as to
any facts relating to rightfulness of the transfer if it has sought
these documents solely to check out appointment or incumbency or
authority to indorse. However, the issuer should promptly return
any requested documents, since this would tend to show its strictly
limited purpose in obtaining them. Thus, the Code, like the Simplifi-
cation Act, overturns much case law imputing notice to the issuer
of adverse claims and wrongful transfers.2 7 Now, the issuer can
avoid getting "notice" and, in fact, the Code intends that it should
avoid it and not bear the burdens which issuers carried under the
old case law.
3. "Further Reasonable Assurances."--Occasionally, an issuer,
moved by excess caution, seeks assurances beyond a signature guar-
antee and authentication of an agent's or a fiduciary's authority to
indorse. If it does so to determine rightfulness of transfer, it is
automatically charged with "notice of all matters contained therein
affecting the transfer." ' Hence, a degree of ignorance is the better
part of prudence. This is especially true since the issuer cannot
demand as of right any guarantee or indemnity against this type
8' This is particularly true as to fiduciary security transfers. G.S. § 25-
8-402(3) (b), (4).28 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-17 (Supp. 1965) with G.S. § 25-8-
402(3).
... This includes constructive notice from a probated will, Lowry v. Com-
mercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (No. 8581) (C.C.D. Md.
1848), or from a relevant document furnished for some other purpose. Cf.
Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 248
U.S. 564 (1918) (notice to commercial department of a bank held also
notice to trust department); Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 159 Misc. 57,
287 N.Y. Supp. 541, 559 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (similar case), or because the
transfer books disclosed the existence of a trust, Magwood v. Railroad Bank,
5 S.C. 379, 390-92 (1874), or because an employee's personal knowledge of
an adverse claim or wrongful transfer was imputed to the issuer under
ordinary rules of notice through an agent.
288 G.S. § 25-8-402(4) ; the Simplification Act had no corresponding sanc-
tion.
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of liability; and unless it has a full indorsement guarantee, it should
not venture into these dangerous waters.
D. Issuer's Duties and Liabilities
Having examined the issuer's right to assurances that indorse-
ments are "genuine and effective" and its limited duty to inquire
into merely wrongful transfers, the issuer's duties and liabilities,
both to the "true owner" (adverse claimant) and the presenter
(purchaser) fall into place. Two sections set forth the issuer's duty
to register transfer 20 and its liability and non-liability for improper
registration of transfer.200
1. Duty to Register-Section 8-401.-Although the Simplifica-
tion Act solved many problems concerning fiduciary security trans-
fers and relieved issuers of the weightiest risks, no pre-Code statute
had generalized the duty to register transfers.21 The Code's man-
date should accelerate transfer registrations by specifying the
circumstances creating the duty to register transfer, making the duty
specifically enforceable, 0 2 and declaring a statutory liability for loss
due to an issuer's "unreasonable delay in registration or from fail-
ure or refusal to register the transfer. ' '203
The duty to register transfer arises if five conditions are met.
Three have been considered: (1) an "appropriate person" has in-
dorsed the security,294 (2) the issuer is assured that these indorse-
ments are "genuine and effective," 290 and (3) "the issuer has no
duty to inquire into adverse claims or has discharged any such
duty. 20 ' The fourth condition-compliance with any applicable
law 2 0 ---needs no special comment. Before considering the impor-
tant fifth condition-that "the transfer is in fact rightful or is to a
bona fide purchaser"s---it should be noted that the issuer may
2"' G.S. § 25-8-401.
2'0 G.S. § 25-8-404.
.01 The Simplification Act exonerated issuers dealing with fiduciary se-
curity transfers but nowhere declared a duty to register transfer.
22The Code does not in terms authorize injunctive relief, but prior law
had recognized a remedy to compel registration. See, e.g., Sheppard v.
Rockingham Power Co., 150 N.C. 776, 781, 64 S.E. 894, 896 (1909) ("A
inandamus or mandatory injunction lies to compel a corporation to transfer
stock... ."). Damages are also available according to G.S. § 25-8-401, com-
ment 3. Compare State ex rel. Townsend v. McIver, 2 S.C. 25, 49 (1870),
recognizing mandatory relief because of the inadequacy of damages.
202 G.S. § 25-8-401(2).
204 G.S. § 25-8-401 (1) (a).
2
°
0G.S. § 25-8-401(1) (b).2
°°G.S. § 25-8-401(1) (c).
2
°'G.S. § 25-8-401 (1) (d).
"'G.S. § 25-8-401 (1) (e).
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waive one or more of these conditions. 99 Thus, an issuer might
register despite noncompliance with some tax requirement, or it
might, however unlikely, waive its right to "reasonable assurance"
that indorsements are "genuine and effective."
The fifth condition states alternatives: (1) either the transfer
is "in fact rightful," e.g., the fiduciary is authorized to indorse and
his transfer complies with the trust or court order, as the case may
be, or (2) the transfer is to a bona fide purchaser, which imposes
a duty to register although the transfer is not "in fact rightful" if
the presenter is a bona fide purchaser-a reading in accord with
other Code provisions... and with existing law."0 ' This fifth con-
dition impliedly negates any duty unless the transfer is "in fact
rightful" or is to a bona fide purchaser, although all other conditions
are satisfied. Suppose that an issuer has no duty to investigate
adverse claims since it had no stop transfer order on its books and
had not demanded excessive documentation giving it constructive
notice of a transfer in breach of trust. Moreover, the issuer has
no knowledge one way or another whether the presenter is a bona
fide purchaser. All it has is a certificate duly indorsed by the appro-
priate person with a signature guarantee by a reputable institution
and a trust instrument showing the trustee's incumbency. Clearly
the issuer must register transfer and should not poke around for
evidence as to the presenter's bona fide-purchaser status or the
rightfulness of transfer. But suppose, however, that in examining
the trust instrument to ascertain the trustee's incumbency it dis-
covers that the transfer is in fact in breach of trust, e.g., the instru-
ment forbids the trustee to transfer a security to himself while the
security presented for transfer is by the trustee to himself. The
Code surely contemplates that the issuer need not participate in
perfecting this wrongful transaction, and that it incurs no liability
for refusing to do so. To take a variant situation, suppose that
the trust instrument, inspected solely to determine the trustee's in-
cumbency, clearly states that no security transfer may be made with-
out court approval of which there is no evidence. The issuer does
not know whether the presenter is or is not a bona fide purchaser.
200 G.S. § 25-8-401, comment 3.
"o See G.S. §§ 25-8-315(1), -404(1).
.0. Green v. Forsyth Furniture Lines, Inc., 198 N.C. 104, 107, 150 S.E.
713, 715 (1929).
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Again, it would appear that the issuer is privileged to refuse regis-
tration.
The more difficult problem is whether the issuer is privileged to
register transfer if it accidentally discovers that the transfer is not
rightful or the presenter is not a bona fide purchaser. It is assumed
that the issuer had no duty to investigate adverse claims since none
of the statutorily prescribed events triggered such a duty, and it is
known that no general duty to inquire into adverse claims exists
under the Code. The relevant question, then, is whether the issuer
acts in "good faith" in registering transfer under such circumstances.
I suggest that, as a general rule, the issuer acts in "good faith"-
that is, it is "honesty in fact in the . . . transaction" 302 -in this
situation. The Code's unmistakable purpose is to confine narrowly
inquiries as to rightfulness of transfers in order to facilitate security
transfers and minimize the burdens of processing transfers. It is
inconsistent with this intent if, under the guise of acting in "good
faith," the issuer must run down every bit of information incidental-
ly or accidentally acquired or try to determine whether, if the trans-
fer is wrongful, the presenter is a bona fide purchaser. These
investigations into possibly complicated and difficult factual matters
would thwart the statutory purpose of simplifying registrations, and
would invite back all of the old difficulties of policing the rightful-
ness of the transfer. "Good faith" should be invoked only in the
most unusual and extreme circumstances. The "good faith" test is,
of course, primarily subjective-did this issuer act honestly ?-but
there is also an objective component in terms of what other persons
skilled in the field would regard as honest and decent conduct under
the circumstances. 0 2"
2. Liability for Registration-Section 8-404.-Having exam-
ined the issuer's duties, privileges, and liabilities to the presenter,
we consider its position vis-A-vis the "true owner," when it registers
a security into some other person's name.
(a) Non-Liability: Only two conditions need be satisfied for the
issuer to avoid liability to "the owner or any other person suffering
loss as a result of the registration of a transfer of a security": (1)
C02 G.S. § 25-1-201(19).
4O Since this article was written, an important and relevant decision by
a federal district court dealing with duty to register transfer under the Code
was reported. Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353(D.N.J. 1965).
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the security carries the "necessary indorsements, 3 0 3 i.e., they are
by an "appropriate person" and they are not "unauthorized," and
(2) the issuer has no duty to investigate adverse claims or has
discharged any such duty.304 Thus, it follows that the issuer is not
liable for registering a merely wrongful transfer.
(b) Liability: Outside this shelter, the general rule is issuer
liability to the true owner.805 Thus, the issuer would be liable if
it registered transfer absent the necessary indorsements, or if the
indorsements were forged, or if it ignored its duty of inquiry.00
So, too, the issuer is liable if it registers transfer when the true
owner has given due notice of loss, theft, or apparent destruction. 07
Given the issuer's liability, its duty is to deliver a like security to
the true owner, but if overissue would result, the issuer must pur-
chase a security on the market or, if unable to do this, pay the true
owner.3
0 8
E. Lost, Stolen and Destroyed Securities
Lost, stolen and destroyed securities raise special problems, since
if the owner has procured a replacement certificate and the original
later turns up, there will be one set of creditor or equity rights now
evidenced by two certificates each of which may be entitled to regis-
tration. Obviously the issuer does not want to recognize both, or,
if it must, it seeks indemnity.
1. Rights of the Owner of the Original Certificate.-Like the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the Code gives the owner a right to
a replacement certificate if he asks for it before the issuer receives
notice that a bona fide purchaser holds the original, files with the
issuer a sufficient indemnity bond, and complies with any other
reasonable requirement imposed by the issuer.3 9 Thus the Code
abandons the Stock Transfer Act's clumsy and little-used require-
ment of a court order for a new certificate 10 in favor of the alterna-
tive procedure, recognized by many corporation statutes and by
,03 G.S. § 25-8-404(1) (a).
.304 G.S. § 25-8-404(1) (b).
305 G.S. § 25-8-404(2).
so" G.S. § 25-8-404(2) (a) referring to G.S. § 25-8-404(1).
807 G.S. § 25-8-404(2) (b). See G.S. § 25-8-405 (lost, stolen or destroyed
securities).3°8 G.S. §§ 25-8-404(2) (c), -104.
8'0 G.S. § 25-8-405(2).
31o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-91 (1965).
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North Carolina"' and widely used in business absent statute, of
voluntarily issuing a replacement certificate with or without posting
bond.312 The Code goes beyond the North Carolina corporation
law provision in making this procedure a legally enforceable duty
of the issuer. Thus the true owner must act promptly upon the
discovery of the loss.
One or two problems should be noted here. First, it is not
clear whether a notice of the lost security must comply with the
specific requirements as to a "stop transfer" notice.113 Although
arguably any reasonable form of notice is sufficient, it is advisable
for the owner to conform his notice to the specific provisions gov-
erning stop transfers. Secondly, the "sufficiency" of an indemnity
bond is a vexing question, since the original security may turn up
years later worth many times its original value. One would suppose
that a bond fixed at 2500 times the present market value of the
lost security would be manifestly unreasonable, but in one case the
unit value had increased from 5 dollars to 12,800 dollars per
share.3 14 Thirdly, "other reasonable requirements"' 15 should pre-
sent no problem where manifestly related to the issuer's duty, e.g.,
an affidavit as to the circumstances of the loss.
2. Loss of True Owner's Rights-If the owner fails seasonably
to notify the issuer of the loss, a bona fide purchaser of the original
certificate prevails. 16 This is easy enough to understand if, for
example, the owner had indorsed the security in blank and it was
lost or stolen; the only vice is wrongful transfer. But the owner
also loses even though the original certificate carries a forged in-
dorsement, for the owner's failure to notify the issuer "within a
reasonable time after he has notice" of the loss precludes the owner
from asserting his claim.31 7 By negative implication, if the owner
does act seasonably he retains his rights to protest an unauthorized
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-57(e) (1965).
8' G.S. § 25-8-405(2)(b) imposes a duty to issue a replacement certifi-
cate if a sufficient bond is forthcoming, but the issuer could waive the bond
if it saw fit without violating Code standards.
"a3 G.S. § 25-8-403(1) (a).
... Davis v. Fraser, 307 N.Y. 433, 121 N.E.2d 406 (1954) (unit value of
lost shares had increased from $5 in 1898 to $12,800 in 1952). Probably, it
would be unreasonable to ask for so large a bond because of the improbability
of so great an increase in value coupled with a security lost for so long a
time.
'" G.S. § 25-8-405 (2) (c).
", G.S. § 25-8-405 (2) (a).
, G.S. § 25-8-405(1).
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indorsement,3 1s although presumably he must still defer to the bona
fide purchaser in respect of claims growing out of a merely wrong-
ful transfer.
3. Bona Fide Purchasers of Original and Replacement Securi-
ties.-Unlike the counterpart provision in the Stock Transfer Act, 19
the original security supposedly lost remains viable, and if it passes
into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, it may have to be registered
even though the replacement certificate issued to the owner has also
been registered . 2' Honoring the original certificate which turns up
in bona fide-purchaser hands is a logical consequence of the Code's
rigidly applying the concept that the certificate is the thing, rather
than the underlying intangible rights, and if the original certificate
is still kicking around, when everyone supposes it to be a small pile
of ashes, a bona fide purchaser should be fully protected since, by
hypothesis, he has no notice of the loss. The problem is more com-
plex if both the original and the replacement certificates are in bona
fide purchasers' hands. Several simple illustrations show the Code
rules in operation :321
Example 1: A loses his bond, and T Corporation issues a
replacement bond which is registered in A's name. The original
bond turns up and is purchased by B, a bona fide purchaser. The
consequences are that
(1) T Corporation must register B's bond.322
(2) T Corporation may either reclaim the replacement bond
from A or recover on the indemnity bond A gave when it applied
for the replacement bond. Hence, only one registered security will
be outstanding, viz., the original security now in B's hands. B is
favored because free negotiability dictates maximum protection to
bona fide purchasers such as B, and after all A was probably best
positioned to avoid the loss that caused all the trouble in the first
place.
Example 2: As in Example (1), A gets a replacement bond
which A sells to C, a bona fide purchaser, who is entitled to have
transfer to him registered with T Corporation. Thereafter, the
318 Ibid.
81 Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-91 (1965) the original security is in-
effective except so far as it represents an action for damages when held by
a bona fide purchaser without notice.
820 G.S. § 25-8-405(3).
21 Except as otherwise noted, G.S. § 25-8-405(3) applies to all of the
following examples.
121 Unless overissue would result in which case G.S. § 25-8-104 governs.
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original bond is found and transferred to B, also a bona fide
purchaser, and also entitled to registration into his name. From
this it follows that
(1) T Corporation may not reclaim the replacement bond now
held by C and registered in C's name (since this would impair
negotiability) ; but
(2) T Corporation may recover on A's indemnity bond.
Example 3: As in Example (1), A gets a replacement bond.
The original bond is found and sold to B, a bona fide purchaser,
who is entitled to and gets the bond registered into his (B's)
name. Thereafter, A sells his replacement bond to C, also a bona
fide purchaser and also entitled to registration into his (C's)
name.
The consequences here are the same as in Example 2.
V. CONCLUSION
The Code completes the evolution of investment securities into
fully negotiable instruments controlled by uniform rules applicable
to creditor and equity securities, thereby ending the old law's segre-
gation of shares and bonds between two different statutes (not
always consistent and badly outdated) and also modifying the un-
satisfactory case law concerning the issuer's heavy liabilities on
registering transfer of securities. A major criticism is Article 8's
deference to prior law in reaffirming the traditional absolute liability
of the issuer, who is otherwise almost solely a registrar under the
Code, for honoring forged indorsements-an apparent device to es-
cape the too radical innovation of excusing the issuer except for its
own lack of care. However, even this criticism is muted since,
arguably, the issuer is a convenient focus for liability to the true
owner wronged by transfer on his forged indorsement, and since
also 'the issuer's risk can be shifted (1) to the responsible institu-
tion guaranteeing the transferor's signature, and (2) by insuring
the guarantor or issuer or both. Accordingly, the Code approach
has both the strengths and the weaknesses of a pragmatic rather than
an doctrinaire solution to the problem. On a while, despite some
minor anomalies, the Code fairly and rationally balances all inter-
ests in the issue, ownership, and transfer of securities; its enact-




RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES: INDORSEMENT
'UNAUTHORIZED'
1. Issuer's Liability.-Issuer remains absolutely liable for register-
ing transfer on unauthorized indorsement, G.S. § § 25-8-311 (b),
-404(2). And as to the true owner, issuer must:
a. Furnish a new security, G.S. § 25-8-404(2); or
b. Meet the requirements of G.S. § 25-8-104 if issuing a new
security would result in overissue; but
c. Ordinarily has no liability to pay damages, see G.S. § 25-8-
404, comment 2, except in certain overissue cases, G.S. § 25-8-
104(1) (b).
2. Issuer's Rights.-Although absolutely liable for registering trans-
fer on unauthorized indorsement, issuer has a right to:
a. Recover from the one making the unauthorized indorsement;
b. Recover from the signature guarantor, G.S. § 25-8-312(1),
(3);
c. Recover from person presenting security for registration of
transfer, G.S. § 25-8-306(1) (first sentence), except that a
purchaser for value without notice of adverse claims who re-
ceives new security on registration of transfer warrants only
no knowledge of unauthorized indorsement. G.S. § 25-8-
306(1) (second sentence).
3. Issuer's Duty.-No duty to register transfer on unauthorized in-
dorsement. G.S. § 25-8-401 (1) (a) (by implication).
4. True Owner's Rights.-True owner of a security transferred on
unauthorized indorsement may "reclaim or obtain possession of
the security or a new security," G.S. § 25-8-315(2), or in cer-
tain circumstances secure damages for conversion, G.S. § 25-
8-315, comment 2, from:
a. A bona fide purchaser (and non-bona fide purchaser); -but
not from .
b. A "purchaser for value and without notice of adverse claims
who has in good faith received a new, reissued or reregistered
security on registration of transfer," G.S. § 25-8-311(a) ; nor
from
c. An agent, bailee, or broker on theories of "innocent conver-
sion," G.S. § 25-8-318.
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5. Purchaser's Rights.-No purchaser, including a bona fide pur-
chaser, G.S. § 25-8-302, is entitled to the security as against the
true owner, G.S. §§ 25-8-311(a), -315(2) ; but a "purchaser for
value and without notice of adverse claims who has in good faith
received a new, reissued or reregistered security on registration
of transfer" prevails over the true owner, G.S. § 25-8-311 (a).
APPENDIX B
RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES: TRANSFER WRONGFUL
BUT INDORSEMENT NOT 'UNAUTHORIZED'
1. Issuer's Liability to True Owner.-Issuer not liable to true own-
er for registering transfer even though transfer is wrongful, if
a. Security bore necessary indorsements, G.S. § 25-8-404(1) (a),
and
b. Issuer had no duty to investigate adverse claims or discharged
such duty, G.S. § 25-8-404(b). Duty of inquiry into right-
fulness of transfer arises only if
A. Stop transfer notice received, G.S. § 25-8-403(1) (a), or
B. Issuer is charged with notice of adverse claims from con-
trolling instruments, G.S. §§ 25-8-403 (1) (b), -402(4).
2. Issuer's Duty to Purchaser.-Issuer must register transfer if
transfer is in fact rightful or if presenter is a bona fide purchaser,
G.S. § 25-8-401(1) (e).
a. Failure or delay in carrying out duty. to register transfer
makes issuer liable, G.S. § 25-8-401 (2).
b. Issuer's performance of duty to register transfer precludes
liability to true owner, G.S. § 25-8-404(1).
3. Issuer's Rights on Registering Transfer.-Before registering
transfer, issuer may demand full compliance with G.S. § 25-8-
401 (1), and assurances that indorsements are effective, G.S. §
25-8-402, including
a. Signature guarantee, G.S. §§ 25-8-402(1) (a), -312(1); but
b. Issuer may not demand guarantee that transfer is rightful as
condition of registering transfer, G.S. § 25-8-312(2), since
issuer is ordinarily no longer liable for merely wrongful trans-
fers, G.S. § 25-8-404(1).




a. Reclaim possession of the security so transferred, e.g., against
any purchaser except a bona fide purchaser, G.S. § 25-8-
315(1) ; or
b. Obtain possession of a new security from issuer, G.S. §§ 25-
8-315(1), -404(2) ; or
c. Have damages against anyone except a bona fide purchaser,
G.S. § 25-8-315(1); and
d. Assert any other rights against person wrongfully transfer-
ring the security; but has no rights against agents, bailees,
brokers, etc., for "innocent conversion," G.S. § 25-8-318.
5. Purchaser's Rights.-Bona fide purchaser is
a. Entitled to the security, G.S. § 25-8-301(1), (2);
b. Entitled to registration of transfer by issuer, G.S. § 25-8-
401(1) (e) ;
c. Not liable to the true owner, G. S. § 25-8-315 (1); and
d. Not liable to issuer on presenter's warranty, G.S. § 25-8-
306(1), since he is "entitled to the registration" of the securi-
ty as bona fide purchaser, G.S. § 25-8-401(1) (e).
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